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I. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A CENTURY OF 
DISCONTINUOUS DEBATE 
CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A little more than one hundred years ago, in 1909 (the same year as the 
founding conference for the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology1), 
the U.S. Supreme Court held its first and thus far only full-blown criminal 
trial under its original jurisdiction.  The defendants were a group of city 
officials and townspeople from Chattanooga, Tennessee, and the charges 
were criminal contempt.  The charges arose from the lynching of Ed 
Johnson—a black man accused of raping a white woman—an act of 
defiance in response to the Supreme Court’s assertion of jurisdiction to 
conduct federal habeas corpus review of his case.  Johnson’s state court trial 
began two weeks after the crime and concluded four days later; his lawyers 
had been allotted only ten days to prepare his defense.  Johnson was 
convicted and sentenced to death by an all-white jury on extremely flimsy 
evidence (the victim and sole witness to the crime testified, “I will not 
swear that he is the man”) in a hasty proceeding suffused with the threat of 
mob violence.  The Tennessee Supreme Court denied Johnson’s appeal, but 
Justice John Marshall Harlan (famous dissenter in Plessy v. Ferguson2 
thirteen years earlier), after consulting with his brethren, accepted habeas 
review of the case as the Circuit Justice hearing emergency appeals from 
 
∗ Howard J. & Katherine W. Aibel Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, and Judge 
Robert M. Parker Endowed Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law. 
1 The Journal was a product of the “National Conference on Criminal Law and 
Criminology,” held in 1909 to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Northwestern University 
School of Law.  Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, About the Journal: History of The 
Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/about/ (last 
visited Aug. 18, 2010). 
2 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., disssenting). 
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the Sixth Circuit.  The day following Justice Harlan’s order, a mob removed 
Johnson from his cell with the tacit permission of jail officials and the 
county sheriff.  The mob brought Johnson to the county bridge that spanned 
the Tennessee River, where they hanged him and also shot him more than 
fifty times.  One of those involved was a deputy sheriff who fired five shots 
himself at point-blank range and left a note pinned to Johnson’s body that 
read: “To Justice Harlan.  Come get your n——r now.”  The Supreme 
Court, in an opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, rejected vociferous 
defense arguments that the Court’s assertion of jurisdiction over the case 
constituted an unlawful intervention in state processes and held instead that 
the violation of the Court’s order, if willful, would constitute criminal 
contempt.3  Ultimately, the sheriff, a deputy sheriff, and four leaders of the 
lynch mob were convicted of contempt at trial and given sentences ranging 
from sixty to ninety days in prison, though the sheriff was greeted as a hero 
in Chattanooga upon his early release by a crowd of 10,000 supporters.4 
No one doubts that death penalty litigation has changed a great deal in 
the past on hundred years, as this dramatic case illustrates.  The authority of 
the United States Supreme Court and the federal courts more generally to 
review state capital and criminal convictions is now unquestioned, thanks in 
no small part to the Chattanooga contempt prosecutions.  Moreover, starting 
in the decades following Johnson’s lynching and accelerating during the 
constitutional criminal procedure revolution of the 1960s, the Supreme 
Court established a plethora of constitutional guarantees regarding state 
capital and criminal processes—including the rights to appointed counsel, 
representative juries, and insulation from the threat of mob violence, among 
many others.  Ironically, Ed Johnson’s lawyers raised all three of these 
claims in their representation of him, but to no avail.  Indeed, it is clear that 
the recognition of these federal rights was driven in large part by trials like 
Johnson’s—hasty, mob-driven capital trials of black defendants in state 
courts in the South that could be so perfunctory as to earn the sobriquet 
“legal lynchings.”5  The procedural world of Ed Johnson’s trial is 
unrecognizable today and elicits amazed headshakes when presented to 
 
3 United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573-74 (1906). 
4 All of the facts regarding Johnson’s trial and lynching and the contempt proceedings 
that followed are taken from Mark Curriden, A Supreme Case of Contempt, A.B.A. J., June 
2009, at 34, available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_supreme_ 
case_of_contempt/. 
5 See generally Michael J. Klarman, Powell v. Alabama: The Supreme Court Confronts 
“Legal Lynchings,” in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 1, 42-43 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) 
(describing the phenomenon of the Supreme Court responding to “legal lynchings” with new 
constitutional protections in the context of the famous “Scottsboro Boys” case). 
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current law students studying the history of criminal procedure and federal 
habeas corpus. 
In contrast to the transformation of the legal process for capital trials, 
many assume that the nature of public discourse about capital punishment 
has remained relatively static, with the same old, well-worn arguments 
about the morality or wisdom of the death penalty recycled through the 
generations.  There is a non-fanciful basis for this assumption, as some of 
the most familiar arguments in debates about the death penalty make a 
fairly unchanged appearance across the centuries.  The leading scholarly 
work on the history of the American death penalty describes a college 
student at Columbia who, having left an essay until the last minute, sighs 
that time pressure forced him “to take refuge in some old thread bare 
subject as Capital punishment”—in 1793!6  What was already “threadbare” 
at the time of our nation’s founding has seen more than 200 years of further 
wear and tear.  Any student of death penalty debates over the generations 
recognizes the timeless quality of certain approaches.  For example, Cesare 
Beccaria’s seminal 1764 essay Of Crimes and Punishments,7 the first 
sustained attack on the death penalty in the modern West, argued that long-
term incarceration is a better deterrent than death and that executions set a 
bad example for the populace, decrying the absurdity of the state killing in 
an attempt to demonstrate that killing is wrong.  These arguments could be 
lifted and dropped into a contemporary state legislative session or high 
school debater’s file without any change at all. 
Our purpose in this essay is to challenge the easy (because partially 
true) assumption that there is nothing new under the sun in death penalty 
discourse.  Rather, we contend that debates about capital punishment have 
been as much discontinuous as continuous over the past century.  Some 
arguments that were made in the past have been entirely discredited or even 
forgotten today, while our current debates contain arguments that would be 
utterly foreign to denizens of earlier decades, despite the fact that they cared 
deeply about the issue of capital punishment in their own times.  We 
address two “lost” arguments from the past in favor of the retention of 
capital punishment: the contention that capital punishment was a necessary 
antidote to extrajudicial lynchings and the defense of capital punishment as 
part of a larger program of eugenics endorsed by many progressive leaders 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  We also explore two 
“new” abolitionist arguments from the present: the fiscal argument about 
 
6 See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 88 (2002). 
7 See generally CESARE BECCARIA, OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (1764), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/cb/crim_pun.htm. 
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the greater cost of capital punishment even in comparison to life 
imprisonment and the concerns raised about the suffering of those awaiting 
execution for lengthy periods (so-called Death Row Phenomenon).  We 
hope to show not only that death penalty discourse has not been as static as 
is often assumed, but also that the debates of each era provide a window 
onto both the nature of the actual practice of the death penalty in different 
times and the broader social contexts in which that practice has operated. 
II. TWO FORGOTTEN ARGUMENTS FOR THE RETENTION OF  
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
Consider the following thought experiment.  Imagine asking the 
members of any current audience in the United States to give the two 
strongest arguments they can think of in favor of the retention of capital 
punishment.  The audience members would doubtless disagree and produce 
a varied list of considerations, but it is highly unlikely that such a list would 
contain arguments about either the prevention of lynchings or the 
promotion of a program of eugenics.  Yet these two considerations were 
powerfully present in the lively debates about capital punishment that took 
place a century ago.  Not everyone who supported capital punishment in the 
early twentieth century found either or both of these arguments persuasive, 
and not everyone concerned about lynchings or enthusiastic about the 
eugenics movement supported capital punishment.  Yet everyone familiar 
with public discourse about the death penalty at the time would have 
recognized the relevance of these considerations to the debate and, indeed, 
their sometimes decisive impact on policy.  In what follows, we hope to re-
capture a flavor of the significance of these issues to early twentieth-century 
debates about the death penalty and explore what light this significance 
sheds on the changing role of capital punishment as a social practice over 
the past century. 
A. THE DEATH PENALTY AS A NECESSARY ANTIDOTE TO LYNCHING 
Our country’s shameful history of lynchings—extrajudicial executions 
mostly of black men suspected of criminal acts against whites—has been 
well-documented.  During the Reconstruction Era in the South, freed blacks 
were frequently the target of lethal violence even in the absence of any 
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing, merely as part of “the wave of 
counterrevolutionary terror that swept over large parts of the South” after 
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the Civil War.8  But the practice of lynching continued robustly well past 
Reconstruction and into the twentieth century, primarily in the South, 
claiming the lives of 4,708 people between the years of 1882 (when the 
Tuskegee Institute first began keeping such records) and 1944 (after which 
lynchings declined steeply).9  The vast majority of these victims were black 
men, and while statistically, the most commonly cited motivation for 
lynching was the suspected murder of a white person by a black man, the 
“most emotionally potent excuse” was the claim that a black man had raped 
a white woman.10  Historians of lynching in the South find it difficult to 
overstate the centrality of the fear of black rapists to the practice of 
lynching: “Black men were lynched for other crimes, but rape was always 
the key.”11  Even high-level elected officials in the South publicly endorsed 
lynching as the only “suitable punishment” for black men who raped white 
women.12  Lynching was so entrenched a practice that in the most intense 
period of lynchings in American history, 1889-1893,13 considerably more 
people were lynched than executed nationwide—921 to 556, by one 
count.14 
 
8 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, 425 
(1988); see generally GEORGE C. RABLE, BUT THERE WAS NO PEACE: THE ROLE OF 
VIOLENCE IN THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION (1984). 
9 See PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK 
AMERICA viii (2002). 
10 RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 45 (1997). 
11 EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH-
CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH 240 (1984). 
12 KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 45-46 (quoting U.S. Senator Theodore Bilbo of 
Mississippi, among others). 
13 AYERS, supra note 11, at 238. 
14 James W. Garner, Crime and Judicial Inefficiency, 29 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 601 (1907), 
reprinted in DEBATERS’ HANDBOOK SERIES: SELECTED ARTICLES ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
10, 11 (C. E. Fanning, ed., 1909) (reproducing the table compiled by the Chicago Tribune 
and published in 1906).  Ayers places the number of lynchings during this period at “nearly 
700” but does not offer a specific source reference and does not indicate whether this figure 
includes both black and white victims.  See AYERS, supra note 11, at 238.  A source 
comprehensively comparing the number of lynchings and legal executions over time finds 
that lynchings outnumbered legal executions in the South and Border states (where the vast 
majority of lynchings occurred) between the years 1886 and 1895, with the balance shifting 
toward legal executions over the next three decades.  During this entire period (1886-1925), 
lynchings never fell below half the number of executions, and the total numbers of lynchings 
and executions in the two regions over this thirty-year period came out almost exactly equal.  
See HOWARD W. ALLEN & JEROME M. CLUBB, RACE, CLASS, AND THE DEATH PENALTY: 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 84 tbl. 4.3 (2008).  Moreover, the ratio of 
lynchings to executions is higher and more sustained over time for blacks.  See id.  The exact 
number of lynchings (and, in this period, of executions as well) is probably impossible to 
determine, but precision is not crucial to the argument; any of the figures listed above 
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The practice of lynching had some obvious implications for the 
practice of capital punishment at the turn of the century.  Many victims of 
lynching were first identified as criminal suspects by their arrest on capital 
charges.  Lynchings frequently commenced with mobs dragging capital 
suspects from their jail cells, often with the tacit or active participation of 
local officials, before any trial could take place or lawful sentence be 
imposed.15  Even when the criminal process was allowed to run its course, 
the threat of mob violence pervaded many trials, particularly trials of black 
men charged with capital crimes against white victims.  Jurors in such cases 
must have felt intense pressure to yield to the passion of the mob, if, indeed, 
they did not share that passion themselves.  During Ed Johnson’s trial in 
1906, when the white victim identified Johnson as her rapist, one of the 
jurors had to be restrained by his fellows as he leapt from his chair yelling, 
“If I could get at him, I would tear his heart out right now!”16  The threat of 
lynching affected post-trial proceedings as well; Johnson was by no means 
the only capital defendant advised to relinquish his appellate rights in an 
attempt to stave off a lynch mob (an attempt that proved vain in Johnson’s 
case).17  The ever-present threat of lynching led reformers to urge speeding 
up the criminal process to allow for immediate trials followed by instant 
executions,18 pressures that created the practice known derogatorily as 
“legal lynching,” a process that was often only a hairsbreadth away from 
the illegal version.19  The prevalence of lynching in the Deep South at the 
turn of the century is probably best illustrated by the ingenious argument of 
a defense lawyer to the jury in a case of alleged interracial attempted rape in 
Louisiana in 1907 to the effect that his client must be innocent because 
otherwise he surely would already have been lynched!20 
 
supports the claim that lynchings clearly outnumbered executions for a period shortly before 
the turn of the twentieth century and remained numerically substantial in relation to 
executions for decades after the turn of the century, at least in the regions in which lynching 
was widely practiced.  
15 See AYERS, supra note 11, at 245-46 (describing collusion of local officials); 
KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 42-44 (quoting from NAACP, THIRTY YEARS OF LYNCHING IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 1889-1918, 11-18 (1919)). 
16 See Curriden, supra note 4, at 34.  
17 See id.; see also Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, Capital Punishment as Legal 
Lynching?, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATES: RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 
IN AMERICA 21, 35 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006) (describing a 1929 
execution in Texas in which the defendant’s lawyers waived appeal to avoid a lynching as 
representative of summary capital processes or “legal lynchings”). 
18 AYERS, supra note 11, at 246. 
19 See Klarman, supra note 5, at 2-3. 
20 See Jennifer Wriggins, Comment, Race, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 
103, 109 (1983) (quoting State v. Petit, 119 La. 1013, 1016 (1907) (“Now, don’t you know 
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The practice of lynching, however, affected not only the administration 
of capital punishment as described above, but also public discourse about 
capital punishment as appropriate public policy.  Supporters of capital 
punishment urged that the maintenance of the death penalty was a necessary 
antidote to lynching; indeed, it may well be that some who might otherwise 
have opposed the death penalty came reluctantly to support it as a lesser 
evil, given that the anti-lynching voices tended to come from the more 
politically progressive members of communities in which lynching was 
most prevalent.  The role of lynching in public discourse about capital 
punishment in the early twentieth century is most visible in the debates 
surrounding the wave of abolitionist legislation during the Progressive Era 
and the almost as powerful wave of reinstatement that shortly followed.  
The experiences of Colorado and Tennessee, which both abolished and 
quickly reinstated the death penalty during this period, are particularly 
instructive about the powerful role that lynching could play in the fate of 
the death penalty as law.  But arguments about lynching and capital 
punishment extended beyond specific legislative initiatives and were clearly 
present more generally as stock positions in academic and popular 
treatments of “the death penalty debate” during the first few decades of the 
twentieth century. 
First, consider the role of lynching in the waves of abolition and 
reinstatement during the Progressive Era.  The early decades of the 
twentieth century were the most active period of death penalty repeal and 
reinstatement in American history.  Ten states abolished capital punishment 
between 1897 and 1917, and eight of them reinstated the death penalty by 
the end of the 1930s, some within only a few years of the original 
abolition.21  To be sure, each of these ten states has its own death penalty 
story, and different considerations weighed more or less heavily in different 
places at different times.  Moreover, with the exception of Tennessee, all of 
these states were in the West or Midwest rather than the heartland of 
lynchings in the American South.  Nonetheless, lynchings were “the most 
important common triggering event in reinstatement of the death penalty” 
after abolition, occurring in each of the four states with the shortest periods 
of death penalty abolition.22  The experiences of Tennessee (the only 
Southern state to abolish the death penalty during this era) and Colorado 
 
that, if this n——r had committed such a crime, he never would have been brought here and 
tried . . . he would have been lynched . . . .”)). 
21 John F. Galliher, Gregory Ray & Brent Cook, Abolition and Reinstatement of Capital 
Punishment During the Progressive Era and Early 20th Century, 83 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 538, 543-573 (1992) (providing state-by-state accounts). 
22 Id. at 574 (emphasis added). 
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(which was the first to abolish the death penalty during this era, but 
reinstated before any other states joined it) are particularly helpful in 
understanding the power of lynching in the politics of capital punishment in 
the early twentieth century. 
In Tennessee, abolition was accomplished in 1915 largely as a result of 
the determined efforts of Duke Bowers, a retired Memphis merchant who 
was so involved and influential that the legislation abolishing the death 
penalty was titled the “Duke Bowers’ Bill.”23  Bowers submitted a lengthy 
brief to the legislature in support of the bill, in which he made a plethora of 
arguments against the death penalty, emphasizing in particular the risk of 
executing the innocent.24  But he also responded directly to the argument 
that abolition would lead to more lynchings: “It is claimed by advocates of 
the death penalty that if it is abrogated, it would increase lynching.  
Here . . . statistics come to our aid [because other states did not experience a 
rise in lynchings after abolition].”25  Bowers also maintained that lynch 
mobs are encouraged more by state executions than by abolition: “If the 
State does not consider life sacred, the mob, with ready rope, will strangle 
the suspected. . . .  In other words, why may not the mob do quickly what 
the law does slowly?”26  The Governor of Tennessee received many letters 
urging the Governor’s veto of the bill predicting (or even threatening) mob 
violence in its wake.  A county attorney argued that the bill would “only 
encourage mob law,” while a Tennessee state committee member predicted 
that “if this bill should become law it would be almost impossible to 
suppress mobs in their efforts to punish colored criminals.”27  Governor 
Thomas Rye sent a veto statement to the legislature explaining his refusal to 
sign the bill into law on the grounds that it would “increase crime and 
encourage mob law.”28  But the Governor’s veto was not sent within the 
five-day time period set by state law, and thus abolition was passed in 
Tennessee. 
 
23 Id. at 556-57. 
24 See Duke C. Bowers et. al., Life Imprisonment vs. The Death Penalty, Brief to the 
Honorable Members of the Senate and Lower House of the Fifty-Eighth General Assembly 
and to the Chairman and Members of the Judiciary Committees Thereof (1915), available at 
http://www.archive.org/details/lifeimprisonment00bowe.pdf. 
25 Id. at 18. 
26 Id. 
27 Galliher et al., supra note 21, at 557 (quoting letters received by Tennessee Governor 
Thomas Rye). 
28 Margaret Vandiver & Michel Coconis, “Sentenced to the Punishment of Death:” Pre-
Furman Capital Crimes and Executions in Shelby County, Tennessee, 31 U. MEM. L. REV. 
861, 881 (2001) (quoting Governor’s veto message to the state assembly). 
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What is perhaps most striking about Tennessee’s abolition of capital 
punishment (aside from its brevity, about which more below) is that, despite 
the common listing of Tennessee among the ten Progressive Era abolitionist 
states, Tennessee’s bill did not, in fact, “abolish” the death penalty.  Rather, 
Tennessee’s hard-fought measure abolished the death penalty only for most 
forms of murder; it retained it for both for murder committed by a prisoner 
serving a life sentence (rare) and also for the crime of rape (not so rare), 
which was in practice punished by death only when the perpetrator was 
black.29  Tennessee’s retention for rape was unique among the rest of the 
Progressive Era abolition bills, and it reflected the distinctively Southern 
belief that lynch mob violence simply could not be suppressed in cases of 
black men accused of the rape of white women, especially if the law refused 
to treat such outrages as capital crimes.30 
Tennessee’s abolition was short-lived; the death penalty was reinstated 
a mere four years later in 1919.  The emphasis on lynching in the drive for 
reinstatement was, if anything, even stronger than it had been during the 
abolition battle.  Three lynchings (all of black men) occurred during the 
four-year period of abolition, and all three lynchings were prolonged, 
public, and gruesome affairs involving torture and burning.31  These events 
provoked community outrage, reflected in a series of editorials in the 
Nashville Tennessean, and led to the formation of a citizen-sponsored “Law 
and Order League” to combat lynching.32  Because Tennessee’s period of 
abolition overlapped with the United States’ involvement in World War I, 
anti-lynching advocates also highlighted the effects of such violence on the 
war effort: 
“[t]he lynching . . . yesterday, can but sow disunion among our people, undermine the 
morale of our negro troops, and lessen the effectiveness of our propaganda among the 
colored people for food production and conservation.  It will, therefore, tend to 
prolong the war and increase the price of victory.”33 
 One week after Governor Albert H. Roberts took office in 1919, he 
sent an urgent message to the legislature, calling upon them to repeal 
 
29 BANNER, supra note 6, at 222. 
30 See George W. Hays (former Governor of Arkansas), The Necessity for Capital 
Punishment, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 156, 162 (Julia E. Johnsen ed., 1939) (“[I]t is plainly 
evident that if capital punishment were abolished and the bloodcurdling assaults [earlier 
described by the author as “fiendish crimes of low-grade types of Negroes”] were 
unpunishable by death, mob violence would be supreme.”); see also Vandiver & Coconis, 
supra note 28, at 880.  
31 See Galliher et al., supra note 21, at 564-65. 
32 Id. at 565. 
33 Id. (quoting Lynching Evil to be Fought, NASHVILLE TENNESSEAN, Apr. 25, 1918, at 
8). 
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abolition, charging that “the ‘Bowers Law’[] has been the contributing 
cause to the commission of the crime of murder and to the summary 
vengeance of the mob on the murderer,”34 essentially echoing the concerns 
of Governor Rye’s toothless veto message four years previously.  The 
legislature lost no time in acting; both houses voted by large majorities to 
repeal abolition within twenty-four hours.35 
Colorado’s abolition bill, in contrast to that of Tennessee, enjoyed the 
support of the Governor and was passed by the state senate without 
discussion and by a large majority in 1897.36  But Colorado’s law lasted no 
longer than Tennessee’s (four years) and was reinstated under similar 
pressures—“in the face of what at the time seemed the threat of mob 
rule.”37  In the year preceding reinstatement in Colorado, two gruesome 
lynchings (both of men, one “mulatto” and one black) were carried out 
before large crowds.  The Rocky Mountain Daily News editorialized 
strenuously in favor of reinstatement in order “to prevent the recurrence of 
such horrors.”38  In addition to their intrinsic horribleness, lynching 
represented the frightening threat of the deterioration of the rule of law and 
democratic governance: “The greatest danger in a republic is a mob,” the 
Bowers brief would later argue in Tennessee, quoting a “learned 
statesman.”39  Governing elites, especially in the South, feared the volatility 
of the large class of poor whites, who could easily be moved to racially 
motivated violence in times of economic uncertainty and escalating crime.  
A white woman writing in 1914 on race relations in the South described this 
class as “the nitrogen of the South”—a combustible element “ready at a 
touch” to ignite “and in the ensuing explosion to rend the social fabric in 
every direction.”40  On a less apocalyptic but perhaps more accessible level, 
lynchings also posed a threat to the state’s image: “In the case of such 
crimes [that led to lynching] . . . a jury may be relied upon to fix the penalty 
at death, and the certainty that it will do so will stop the blackening of 
 
34 Vandiver & Coconis, supra note 28, at 882 (quoting Governor Roberts’s message to 
the state assembly). 
35 Id. at 882-83. 
36 Galliher et al., supra note 21, at 553. 
37 HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: AN ANTHOLOGY 10 (rev. ed. 
1967). 
38 Galliher et al., supra note 21, at 561 (quoting Restore Capital Punishment, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN DAILY NEWS, May 24, 1900, at 4). 
39 See Bowers, supra note 24, at 18. 
40 AYERS, supra note 11, at 245 (quoting LILY H. HAMMOND, IN BLACK AND WHITE: AN 
INTERPRETATION OF SOUTHERN LIFE 60-61 (1914)). 
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Colorado’s fair name with lynchings.”41  The apparently widespread belief 
in Colorado that the lack of capital punishment made lynchings more likely, 
if not inevitable,42 undermined the earlier acceptance of abolition.  The 
legislature’s reinstatement was attributed by the press chiefly to the most 
recent murder followed by lynching that had occurred only six months 
previously.43 
Quite apart from the central role that lynching played in the abolition, 
and especially the reinstatement, of capital punishment during the 
Progressive era, the assertion that abolition would increase lynch mob 
violence was a frequently made “stock” argument in the death penalty 
debates of the early twentieth century, untethered to specific legislative 
proposals.  The Bowers brief to the Tennessee legislature is some evidence 
of the general familiarity of the argument, with its reference to the lynching 
argument made by unnamed “advocates of the death penalty.”44  But the 
best proof of the salience of the lynching argument is probably the 
publication in several editions of the popular Debaters’ Handbook on 
capital punishment of an essay entitled “Capital Punishment and 
Lynching,” devoted entirely to the argument that “to abolish capital 
punishment in this country is likely to provoke lynchings.  Whenever 
unusually brutal and atrocious crimes are committed, particularly if they 
cross racial lines, nothing less than the death penalty will satisfy the general 
sense of justice that is to be found in the average American community.”45  
This piece appeared in the first four of five editions of the Handbook, 
published in 1909, 1913, 1917, and 1925, respectively.46  It disappeared 
from the fifth edition, published in 1939, although the argument “Lynchings 
would increase” is included in that volume as part of an outline of 
arguments for and against the death penalty under the general heading “It is 
socially desirable that we retain the death penalty.”47 
 
41 Galliher et al., supra note 21, at 561 (quoting Restore Capital Punishment, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN DAILY NEWS, May 24, 1900, at 4). 
42 Id. at 562. 
43 Id. 
44 See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.  
45 J. E. Cutler, Capital Punishment and Lynching, 29 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 622, (1907), 
reprinted in DEBATERS’ HANDBOOK SERIES: SELECTED ARTICLES ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
17, 21-22 (C.E. Fanning, ed., 1909). 
46 See DEBATERS’ HANDBOOK SERIES: SELECTED ARTICLES ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
(C.E. Fanning, ed., 1909, 1913, and 1917); THE HANDBOOK SERIES: SELECTED ARTICLES ON 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (Lamar T. Beman, ed., 1925) [hereinafter Beman]. 
47 Summary of Arguments, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 231, 243 (Julia E. Johnsen, ed., 
1939). 
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Not surprisingly, the same Handbook series also contains attempted 
refutations of this pro-death penalty lynching argument.  One edition of the 
Handbook contains an excerpt from the learned statesman quoted, but not 
identified, in the Bowers brief who argues, “The greatest danger in a 
republic is a mob, and as long as States inflict the penalty of death, mobs 
will follow the example.”48  Alternatively, some abolitionists in the 
Handbook cleverly countered the claim that lynchings will result from the 
perceived under-enforcement of the law resulting from abolition with the 
plausible assertion that retention of capital punishment itself leads to under-
enforcement of the law, because juries sometimes wrongly acquit for fear of 
inflicting death49 (and thus presumably will incite lynch mobs in this way, 
as well).  A more direct response to the lynching argument, similar once 
again to one of the arguments in the Bowers brief, was made in a 1927 book 
grandly titled Capital Punishment in the Twentieth Century, to the effect 
that if lynchings were really substitutions for capital punishment, one would 
expect to see more of them in abolitionist states.50  Nonetheless, as the book 
points out, lynchings were demonstrably more common in states that 
retained the death penalty than in those that abolished it.  Of course, this 
argument leads to the question of whether the states (particularly those of 
the Deep South) that refused to abolish the death penalty would have 
experienced no rise in lynchings had they abolished it.  But the existence of 
such a counter-argument in an abolitionist-tilted survey of capital 
punishment demonstrates the felt need to address what a review (in this 
illustrious Journal) of the 1927 book places first on a list of retentionist 
arguments: the “danger of lynching.”51 
The prevalence and pride of place of the lynching argument in the 
early years of the twentieth century, both in legislatures and in public 
discourse more broadly, reflects a world in which capital punishment 
played a very different role from its place in our current one.  In this earlier 
world (or at least in regions of it), extrajudicial lethal violence, targeted 
especially at black men suspected of crimes against whites, was so common 
that it could seem foolhardy, sentimental, or simply counterproductive to 
attack the more vulnerable, but morally and socially more benign, legal 
 
48 Robert G. Ingersoll, 24 AM. L. REV. 203 (1890), reprinted in Beman, supra note 46, at 
350. 
49 See Does Capital Punishment Prevent Convictions?, 40 REV. REV. 219, (1909), 
reprinted in DEBATERS’ HANDBOOK SERIES: SELECTED ARTICLES ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
136 (C.E. Fanning, ed., 1909). 
50 E. ROY CALVERT, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 85-86 (1927). 
51 Clifford Kirkpatrick, Review of E. Roy Calvert, Capital Punishment in the Twentieth 
Century (1927), 18 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 609, 611 (1928). 
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form of execution.  In this world, state imposed death was not the worst, or 
even the most likely, fate that could befall one suspected of a capital crime.  
The defiance of the U.S. Supreme Court by Ed Johnson’s lynch mob is a 
powerful symbol of the fragility of the legal order a century ago (at least in 
certain places and with regard to interracial crimes) and the difficult 
tradeoffs that many perceived in the relationship between lynchings and 
legal executions. 
B. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND EUGENICS 
We, the authors, first encountered the proposal that eugenics might 
undergird an argument in support of capital punishment as law clerks for 
Justice Thurgood Marshall.  Working on capital cases in Justice Marshall’s 
chambers, we took pains to familiarize ourselves with the Court’s history of 
constitutional regulation of capital punishment and especially with the 
opinions of our boss, who joined the Court just before it began to 
“constitutionalize” the death penalty in the late 1960s.  We were both struck 
by Justice Marshall’s opinion in the landmark case of Furman v. Georgia,52 
which temporarily struck down capital punishment as it was then 
administered in the United States.  In order to assess whether the death 
penalty was an excessive or unnecessary punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment, Justice Marshall identified “six purposes conceivably served 
by capital punishment: retribution, deterrence, prevention of repetitive 
criminal acts, encouragement of guilty pleas and confessions, eugenics, and 
economy.”53  The rest of list was familiar to us, even formulaic, but—
eugenics??  It seemed to us at the time, in our youth and inexperience, that 
Justice Marshall was conjuring a straw man, positing an argument that no 
one actually made and that could not really be taken seriously. 
A visit to the early twentieth century, however, puts flesh and blood on 
the supposed straw man of the argument from eugenics.  The influence of 
the eugenics movement on those concerned with the problems of crime and 
punishment was enormous and, indeed, central to this Journal’s own 
founding a century ago.  John H. Wigmore, then the Dean of Northwestern 
University School of Law, was a key member of the organizing committee 
for the First National Conference on Criminal Law and Criminology in 
1909, which led to the founding of the American Institute of Criminal Law 
and Criminology and its official organ, this Journal.54  Writing more than a 
 
52 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
53 Id. at 342. 
54 See Jennifer Devroye, The Rise and Fall of the American Institute of Criminal Law 
and Criminology, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 7, 7 (2010). 
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decade later, Wigmore and other members of the Institute explained that 
“the inspiration of Italy’s criminalists was strongly influential in the 
founding of the ‘Journal of the Institute’ in 1909.”55  By “Italy’s 
criminalists,” Wigmore meant Cesare Lombroso and his student Enrico 
Ferri, of the Italian Positivist School, who developed biological theories of 
innate criminality.  Lombroso sought to define the criminal type, Homo 
delinquens, as a throwback to an earlier evolutionary era.56  He believed 
that one could see “the nature of the criminal” in the physical attributes of 
criminals (large jaws, high cheek bones, handle-shaped ears, insensitivity to 
pain, etc.)—“an atavistic being who reproduces in his person the ferocious 
instincts of primitive humanity and the inferior animals.”57  Ferri shared 
Lombroso’s belief in the existence of congenital murderers with distinctive 
physical characteristics and defended the idea of the “born criminal” in his 
most important work, Criminal Sociology, published in 1917 in English 
translation by the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology.58 
Lombroso and Ferri’s belief in the heritability of criminality was of 
obvious relevance to those interested in the science of eugenics, defined by 
its founder, the British naturalist Francis Galton, as “the study of agencies 
under social control that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future 
generations, either physically or mentally.”59  The eugenics movement of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was an attempt to harness 
the science of eugenics “for the improvement of the human race by better 
breeding,” according to Charles B. Davenport, a leader of the movement in 
the United States in the early part of the twentieth century.60  Many 
reformers believed that eugenics offered some obvious prescriptions for 
criminal justice policy, beyond studying the heredity and physical 
characteristics of criminals.  In addition to “positive” eugenics (promoting 
the propagation of the fit), many criminal justice reformers urged policies of 
“negative” eugenics (preventing the propagation of the unfit),61 often citing 
 
55 Robert H. Gault, James W. Garner, Edwin R. Keedy & John H. Wigmore, The 
Progress of Penal Law in the United States of America, 15 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 173, 174 (1924). 
56 See ELOF AXEL CARLSON, THE UNFIT: A HISTORY OF A BAD IDEA 45 (2001). 
57 Id. at 44 (quoting Leonard D. Savitz, Introduction to GINA LOMBROSO-FERRERO, 
CRIMINAL MAN, ACCORDING TO THE CLASSIFICATION OF CESARE LOMBROSO xxv (1911)). 
58 Devroye, supra note 54, at 13. 
59 RUTH CLIFFORD ENGS, THE EUGENICS MOVEMENT: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA xii (2005) 
(quoting Sir Francis Galton, Herbert Spencer Lecture Delivered before the University at 
Oxford, June 5, 1907, in ESSAYS IN EUGENICS 81 (1909)). 
60 Id. (quoting CHARLES DAVENPORT, HEREDITY IN RELATION TO EUGENICS 1 (1911)). 
61 DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN 
HEREDITY 47 (1985). 
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the work of Lombroso.62  In particular, sterilization and even castration 
were frequently at the center of eugenics-inspired proposals to prevent 
crime and punish criminals.63  Many states passed legislation in the first few 
decades of the twentieth century compelling or permitting sterilization of 
those who were epileptic, insane, or mentally retarded, or of those who 
combined some mental defect with criminal behavior, or as punishment for 
those who committed crimes such as rape or indecent exposure, or who 
were recidivist offenders.64 
Despite the belief of many reformers in the early twentieth century that 
the insights of eugenics into the causes of crime yielded obvious beneficial 
prescriptions for crime policy, there was real division among eugenics 
enthusiasts about its implications for capital punishment.  Some of those 
most enthusiastic about the sterilization or castration of prisoners were 
opposed to capital punishment, believing that these alternative responses to 
criminality would be either more effective deterrents or more humane, or 
both.65  Moreover, not every eugenics enthusiast was drawn to “negative” 
policies like sterilization or immigration restriction.  Rather, many social 
radicals and utopians embraced eugenics;66 among these were passionate 
eugenics enthusiasts who supported more voluntary policies like the 
legalization of birth control and euthanasia, disdained the crude theories of 
racial or ethnic superiority that eventually tainted the eugenics movement, 
and strenuously opposed capital punishment.67  For this wing of the 
eugenics movement, their opposition to capital punishment was not a 
position they took despite their eugenic convictions, but rather because of 
them.  Eugenics helped to undermine the assumption of free will that 
underlay the retributive justice of capital (and indeed of all) punishment.  If 
criminal behavior is to some degree determined by heritable biological traits 
(and their interaction with the environment), then the moral case for capital 
punishment based on just deserts is weakened by a corresponding degree (if 
not entirely eliminated).  As an abolitionist writing in 1927 explained, “The 
trend of modern psychological thought . . . [is] that conduct is not 
 
62 See CARLSON, supra note 56, at 399 (offering flowchart depicting Lombroso’s 
influence in the rise of negative eugenics). 
63 See id. at 199-229. 
64 See id. at 248. 
65 See id. at 202-03, 205 (describing views of Dr. Walter Lindley, Dr. W.A. Hammond, 
and Dr. Robert Boal regarding castration and sterilization). 
66 See KEVLES, supra note 61, at 85. 
67 See ALEXANDRA MINNA STERN, EUGENIC NATION: FAULTS AND FRONTIERS OF BETTER 
BREEDING IN MODERN AMERICA 118 (describing the beliefs of eugenics enthusiast and 
innovative reformer August Vollmer). 
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determined by an unknowable something called free will, but by personality 
traits built up through the interaction of heredity and environment.”68 
So why did Justice Marshall identify eugenics as a pro-death penalty 
argument?  As one historian of the eugenics movement explains, “To the 
followers of Lombroso, the criminal problem was solved through 
emigration, perpetual imprisonment, and capital punishment to protect the 
present and to prevent the genetic spread of crime.”69  Even those who 
opposed the death penalty in the early twentieth century found it easy to see 
and articulate the eugenic argument for capital punishment.  As a prominent 
abolitionist explained in 1919, the death penalty “might be defended as an 
agency of conscious artificial selection for the elimination of dangerous 
biologic stocks from the community, in accordance with the ideas of the 
Positivist school of criminologists.”70  Another abolitionist elaborated, 
“There is a eugenic objection sometimes raised to the substitution of life 
imprisonment for Capital Punishment.  A life imprisonment sentence in 
present practice is subject to periodic review and generally means ultimate 
release. . . .  [Thus,] it may be extremely undesirable to allow certain 
persons of tainted heredity to go free.”71  These authors went on to rebut 
such arguments as proving far too much72 and leading to “unthinkable” 
excesses,73 but they phrase their objections as counters to what appears to 
be a “stock” or familiar argument. 
The salience of the eugenic argument in favor of capital punishment is 
most clear in its frequent repetition in the essays and articles collected in the 
Debaters’ Handbook series published five times over the course of the 
thirty years between 1909 and 1939.  In the first edition of the Handbook, a 
supporter of capital punishment replied to a recent abolitionist essay with 
the following observations drawn from the work of Lombroso:  
The fact is that there is mentally a true criminal type . . . .  Heredity and atavism 
between them have produced the criminal recidivist, the throw-back in the evolution 
of mankind. 
Granting . . . that reformation is out of the question, are we not to continue and say 
that the interests, and even the being of the criminal, are to be sacrificed for the 
 
68 CALVERT, supra note 50, at 150 (internal quotes omitted). 
69 CARLSON, supra note 56, at 68 (emphasis added). 
70 RAYMOND T. BYE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 97-98 (1919). 
71 CALVERT, supra note 50, at 193. 
72 Id. at 195 (“To assert that society has the right to kill those of its members who are of 
no use to it or who are judged unfit to live, is a very dangerous argument which might be 
applicable to many persons and groups other than murderers!”). 
73 BYE, supra note 70, at 98 (“[T]he logical application of this principle would involve 
such an increase in the number of executions that it is unthinkable.”). 
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welfare of the public?  Surely if the first premise is correct, the second necessarily 
follows.74   
In the same edition of the Handbook, an abolitionist listed eight arguments 
in favor of capital punishment, the second of which was that “[i]t rids 
society of criminal pests and dangerous savages.”75  Although the author 
ultimately advocated for reliance on “brick walls and strong cells”76 instead 
of the death penalty, the prominence of such a social hygiene argument on 
this list is telling with regard to the salience of the eugenic argument the 
debates of the time.  Both of these essays were reprinted in the second and 
third editions of the Handbook, and the Vicars essay was also reprinted in 
the fourth edition.  Although neither essay made it into the fifth edition of 
the Handbook, that volume’s outline of arguments for and against the death 
includes the argument that “[i]t is socially desirable that we retain the death 
penalty,” because “[t]he elimination of the worst classes of murderers . . . is 
biologically better.”77 
Despite the prominence of these eugenic arguments about capital 
punishment in the debates of the early twentieth century, at least one 
historian of the American death penalty, Stuart Banner, argues that “the 
death penalty was never widely perceived to have a eugenic basis.”78  
Banner recognizes that during the heyday of the eugenics movement in the 
early part of the twentieth century, “there were a few proponents of the 
death penalty on the ground that it would prevent the worst criminals from 
reproducing.”79  However, Banner contends that this view was not 
particularly influential because it was undermined both by the fact that 
“capital punishment was a patently inefficient eugenic program” and by the 
way in which “[b]iological theories of crime tended to undermine, not 
support, capital punishment.”80  Banner is surely right that the eugenic 
argument for capital punishment lacks some logical force, but its ubiquity 
and persistence over time (at least until World War II) suggest that its 
persuasiveness lay in something other than its logic. 
 
74 C.J. Ingram, Shall We Abolish the Death Penalty?, 170 WESTMINSTER REV. 91-98, 
(1908), reprinted in DEBATERS’ HANDBOOK SERIES: SELECTED ARTICLES ON CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 156, 164 (C. E. Fanning ed., 1909) (emphasis added).  
75 G. Rayleigh Vicars, Ought Capital Punishment to be Abolished?, 143 WESTMINSTER 
REV. 561 (1895), reprinted in DEBATERS’ HANDBOOK SERIES: SELECTED ARTICLES ON 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 137, 139 (C. E. Fanning ed., 1909). 
76 Id. at 143.  
77 Summary of Arguments, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 231, 243 (Julia E. Johnsen ed., 1939) 
(emphasis added). 
78 BANNER, supra note 6, at 213. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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What that something else might be is illuminated in the fifth edition of 
the Handbook series published in 1939, when the eugenic argument in favor 
of capital punishment became more overtly and intensely racist, at the same 
time that eugenic ideas and policies were reaching full flower in Nazi 
Germany.  In one excerpt, a supporter of capital punishment urged the 
maintenance of the death penalty as a form of societal self-defense against 
dangerous inferior groups, like immigrants and blacks.  On the topic of 
immigration, the author (a member of the Michigan State Bar Association’s 
Committee on Capital Punishment) explained, “With the good immigrant 
has come the bad.  The scum of Europe, like the plague of the locusts, has 
descended upon us.”81  On the topic of blacks, the author was even more 
explicit:  
It has been established beyond any doubt that our modern killer is biologically 
inferior.  Authorities agree upon this fact.  To illustrate: Memphis, with its illiterate, 
defective Negro population, has the highest murder rate of any American city.  On the 
other hand, St. Paul and Minneapolis, of almost pure Scandinavian stock, have the 
lowest.82 
The author urged that the death penalty “will terminate the breeding of 
diseased stock . . . and it will prevent the repetition by this offender, of 
further monstrous acts.”83  Along similar lines, the former Governor of 
Arkansas argued that the death penalty was necessary to deal with one of 
the South’s most serious problems—“the Negro question.”84  The former 
Governor explained that “the latter race is still quite primitive, and in 
general culture and advancement in a childish stage of progress.”85  He 
warned, “If the death penalty were to be removed from our statute-books, 
the tendency to commit deeds of violence would be heightened owing to 
this Negro problem.  The greater number of the race do not maintain the 
same ideals as the whites.”86  Governor Hays’s arguments echo the earlier 
views of J.E. Cutler, published in the first several volumes of the Handbook 
series, that the “the colored race in the United States is a child race,”87 one 
that does not share “the same standards as the whites, either intellectually, 
morally, or industrially.”88  Both Hays and Cutler argued that the 
 
81 John M. Dunham, Report of Committee on Capital Punishment, 1928, 8 MICH. ST. 
BAR J. 279 (1929), reprinted in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 192, 195 (Julia E. Johnsen ed., 1939).  
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Hays, supra note 30, at 161.  
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 162. 
87 Cutler, supra note 45, at 164. 
88 Id. 
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predisposition of the black race to heinous crimes meant that capital 
punishment was necessary both to deter such crimes and to prevent the 
outraged lynchings that would inevitably follow in the absence of swift and 
certain capital justice. 
Thus, it is not surprising that Thurgood Marshall, alone among the 
Justices who each wrote individually on the question of the constitutionality 
of capital punishment in Furman, would remember the eugenic argument in 
favor of capital punishment, with its eventually explicit racial cast.  Justice 
Marshall had worked on numerous criminal and capital cases early in his 
career in the 1930s and 1940s, and arguments of the type made by Cutler 
and Hays were not ancient history to him, but rather lived reality.  The rise 
of eugenics as a powerful new idea, while often embraced by progressive 
reformers, also allowed old-fashioned racists—the ideological descendents 
of those who had defended slavery on the grounds that some inferior races 
were “natural slaves”89—to add a new scientific gloss to an old prejudice.  
When considered together, the early twentieth century arguments about 
lynching and eugenics unearthed above reveal how much the debates about 
capital punishment at that time were debates about race and how much the 
death penalty itself, as it was practiced on the ground, was racially 
inflected.  Justice Marshall clearly did not need such a reminder, but 
perhaps we, in our supposed “post-racial” society in which other issues 
predominate in our own death penalty debates, are more prone to forget.  
Thus, we would do well to heed the lessons that these two “lost” arguments 
teach us about the strong connections, which would have been obvious to 
contemporaneous observers a century ago, between the death penalty 
question and what Governor Hays called “the Negro question.” 
III.  TWO NEW ARGUMENTS AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
The most powerful “new” argument in the death penalty debate—one 
that simply did not exist in any sustained form prior to the modern era of 
capital punishment in the United States (post-1976)—emphasizes the 
greater cost of capital punishment compared to the alternative of long-term 
 
89 T.R.R. Cobb, author of an influential nineteenth-century study of the Southern law of 
slavery, explained that his “‘inquiry into the physical, mental, and moral development of the 
negro race, seems to point them clearly, as peculiarly fitted for a laborious class.’”  See 
Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the Global Economy, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1022 (2002) (quoting Thomas R.R. Cobb, AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY 46-47 (1858)).  The idea of “natural slaves” relied upon by some 
nineteenth-century defenders of slavery in the United States can be traced back to Aristotle.  
See generally Fred Miller, Aristotle’s Political Theory, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (2002), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics/. 
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(even lifetime) imprisonment.  The argument has become so ubiquitous in 
contemporary debates about the death penalty that it is hard to imagine that 
it was virtually non-existent until a few decades ago.  Indeed, in one 
generation, the cost argument has become perhaps the greatest threat to the 
continued robust use of capital punishment in the United States.  This 
section will examine how and why the cost argument emerged over the past 
few decades as well as the reasons for its virtual absence in death penalty 
discourse during the first centuries of capital practice in this country.  The 
section will also highlight the particular prominence of the cost argument in 
the past few years and its critical role in efforts to limit and repeal the death 
penalty.  The cost argument is important not simply because it is new, but 
because it significantly broadens the constituency concerned about the 
death penalty.  The utilitarian, community-oriented cast of the cost 
argument has much more traction in popular and legislative debate than its 
longstanding counterparts emphasizing equality and individual rights-based 
objections to capital punishment. 
A second important “new” argument in the death penalty debate 
focuses on another aspect of contemporary capital practice distinctive to our 
time: the prolonged interval between the pronouncement of sentence and 
execution, often endured by the condemned in essentially solitary 
confinement.  Unlike concerns about cost, concerns about excessive death 
row confinement have not emerged in public discourse or legislative debate 
as the most pressing grounds for challenging the death penalty.  But the 
claim that prolonged death row confinement is unconstitutionally cruel 
exposes some of the central failings of the prevailing capital system.  
Although presently cast as a claim of individual deprivation, it also calls 
into question whether the American death penalty as a system can continue 
on its present course.  Moreover, the central fact behind the claim—that 
death sentences are often hollow pronouncements—has generated a new, 
victim-oriented assault on the death penalty emphasizing the inability of our 
capital system to provide meaningful redress for victims’ families. 
A. THE ABSENCE AND EMERGENCE OF COST CONSIDERATIONS IN THE 
AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY DEBATE 
At one level, the explanation for the absence of the cost argument prior 
to the modern era is rather straightforward.  Before the U.S. Supreme Court 
embarked on its course of constitutional regulation of capital punishment in 
the early 1970s, the costs associated with the death penalty were relatively 
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minimal.90  This was true both in comparison to the cost of available non-
capital sanctions throughout our history and in comparison to the cost of the 
death penalty in the present day.  Prior to the Court’s intervention, capital 
trials were not categorically different from cases involving non-capital 
serious felonies, and the length and costs associated with such trials were 
modest compared to contemporary practice.  Post-conviction expenses in 
capital cases were likewise relatively modest, both in terms of litigation 
costs (state and federal habeas) and incarceration costs.  For most of our 
country’s history, the average time between pronouncement of sentence and 
execution was measured in weeks and months (not years and decades), so 
there was little reason to believe that the pronouncement of a sentence of 
death imposed a significant ongoing financial burden for the state.  Hence, 
to the extent financial considerations bore on the death penalty debate prior 
to the modern era, they tended to support rather than undermine the case for 
capital punishment. 
Yet interestingly, throughout our country’s history, the question of cost 
and the death penalty was rarely broached—even during times of economic 
crisis and even when the relative cost advantages or disadvantages of 
executions seemed obvious.  During the colonial era, for example, the death 
penalty was likely more expensive than its alternatives.  Incarceration was 
not yet a viable penal option (jails were used primarily for debtors and pre-
trial incarceration), and the most common non-capital sanctions—fines, 
corporal punishments (whippings, brandings), and shaming punishments 
(the stock and the public cage)—involved fewer community resources than 
those expended on public executions.91  It was common to allow a period of 
several weeks or even months to elapse between sentencing and execution 
to facilitate the offender’s repentance and to make arrangements for the 
edifying spectacle that the execution was expected to offer.92  The costs 
associated with even this short-term delay were not insignificant (the simple 
housing and feeding of the condemned was a “significant expense,”93 as 
well as the cost of pursuing and recapturing condemned inmates who 
 
90 A more sustained discussion of the role of the cost argument in past and present 
American death penalty discourse can be found in Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, 
Cost and Capital Punishment: A New Consideration Transforms an Old Debate, 2010 CHI. 
L. F. 93. 
91 David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789-1865, in THE OXFORD 
HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 111, 112 
(Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995). 
92 See BANNER, supra note 6, at 17. 
93 Id. 
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escaped from the often insecure jails94), but these expenses were absorbed 
without much reflection or reservation.  The unquestioned willingness to 
incur such costs reflected a consensus about the importance of the 
criminal’s salvation (to be secured by the power of the impending execution 
to focus an offender’s attention on his redemption) as well as the 
assumption that public attendance at executions served valuable functions 
in terms of general deterrence and community cohesiveness. 
Toward the end of the colonial era, influential Founding era thinkers, 
including Benjamin Franklin and James Madison, offered the first sustained 
critique of the American death penalty, urging restriction and even abolition 
in the new republic.  These and other early American critics of the death 
penalty borrowed heavily from the enormously influential work of Cesare 
Beccaria, whose essay Of Crimes and Punishments, published in 1764, 
called for the wholesale abolition of capital punishment.95  Becarria’s essay 
included arguments from political theory (individuals lacked the right to 
commit suicide and thus could not delegate that power to the state) as well 
as instrumental claims (the threat of “perpetual slavery” was a sufficient 
deterrent to crime and the purported benefits of public executions were 
undermined by their “barbarity”).  Becarria’s arguments framed the debate 
about the death penalty on both sides of the Atlantic during the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and the question of “cost” in its 
modern sense (e.g., the relative financial costs to the state of imposing death 
versus some alternative punishment) was entirely absent from his lengthy 
critique notwithstanding his strongly utilitarian approach to the issue.  Some 
other influential theorists, including Jeremy Bentham and Thomas 
Jefferson, observed that the death penalty prevented offenders from 
engaging in labor which could provide compensation to their victims or the 
State,96 but these observations were not tied to a more comprehensive 
calculus of the financial costs of the death penalty versus its alternatives.  In 
 
94 See id. at 18 (“The expenses of twice recapturing John Brown [a condemned burglar 
who twice escaped from the Litchfield jail], for example, formed a major part of the bill 
submitted to the Connecticut Assembly by William Stanton, Litchfield’s jailer.”). 
95 See BECCARIA, supra note 7. 
96 See HUGO ADAM BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT: STUDIES IN THE MORALITY, LAW, AND 
POLITICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 76-78 (1987) (discussing Bentham’s essay, The Rationale 
of Punishment, published in 1775, in which Bentham argues that imprisonment was a 
superior punishment to execution because the death penalty was “not convertible to profit” 
and lacked “frugality” in that convicts could not provide “compensation” to victims or to the 
state); BANNER, supra note 6, at 95 (discussing Jefferson’s argument in favor of abandoning 
capital punishment for lesser felonies in the newly independent state of Virginia in 1778 
because criminals who were not executed might “be rendered useful in various labors for the 
public”). 
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any event, it is clear that questions of financial cost took a back seat to the 
more prevalent arguments about optimal deterrence and appropriate moral 
education that lay at the heart of the new utilitarian critique of the death 
penalty. 
Nor did the question of financial cost emerge during the great prison-
building period of the early and mid-nineteenth century.  Pennsylvania, 
New York, and other states through the Northeast and Midwest inaugurated 
a new era of criminal justice with the establishment of penitentiaries, 
founded on the belief that wrongdoers could be reformed if removed from 
pernicious societal influences and subjected to a regimen of strict discipline 
in a “corruption-free environment.”97  The construction of prisons required 
enormous outlays of public funds and offered a previously unavailable 
alternative to the death penalty: lengthy incarceration.  Notwithstanding the 
obvious financial impact of the penitentiary movement, and the possibility 
that the death penalty might provide a less expensive alternative for serious 
offenders, there is little indication that the debate over the death penalty 
shifted toward considerations of cost in the wake of massive public 
expenditures on the newly constructed, imposing prisons.  The absence of 
such argument is likely attributable to the confidence of reformers that the 
new prisons would produce greater social benefits than costs.98  On the one 
hand, the penitentiaries were expected to provide the conditions for genuine 
repentance (and thus salvation), a benefit that the religiously motivated 
reformers were unlikely to subject to a conventional “cost-benefit” analysis.  
In addition, reformers believed that penitentiaries would significantly 
reduce recidivism through reformation, a promise that, if realized, might 
outweigh the costs of the prisons themselves.99  Perhaps most importantly, 
the penitentiary system was organized around the principle of compelled 
labor, a highly valuable commodity in an era of increased 
industrialization.100  Prison labor greatly offset the cost of building and 
 
97 DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN 
THE NEW REPUBLIC 71 (1971). 
98 Rothman, supra note 91, at 121 (“Given the promise of reform, legislatures readily 
appropriated the funds for construction, and when more cells were needed, they made the 
funds available.”). 
99 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 80 
(1993) (describing the confidence of “almost all prison reformers” that the new penitentiary 
“was stern but effective medicine” for shaping the characters and promoting the 
rehabilitation of prisoners). 
100 See, e.g., MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF PAIN: THE PENITENTIARY IN THE 
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1750-1850, at 109-11 (1978) (describing how Jeremy Bentham 
touted the Panopticon as a source of free labor). 
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maintaining prisons and thus muted concerns about the potential costs to the 
state of lengthy incarceration. 
Hence, even during the Progressive Era, when many states revisited 
the wisdom of capital punishment, references to the costs associated with 
lengthy incarceration are difficult to find.  Indeed, in the widely available 
Debaters’ Handbook on capital punishment discussed above, few 
references to cost appear in the dozens of collected excerpts from 
newspapers, magazines, and scholarly journals, and when the subject arises, 
it is treated rather perfunctorily.  For example, one author lists as the sixth 
of eight arguments in favor of the death penalty that “[i]t saves the 
community all cost of keeping criminals for many years,” but the author 
quickly acknowledges the “rude truth” that “men under a life sentence 
could be placed in a position to earn the cost of their keep and a good 
margin over in addition.”101  Overall, from the Founding era well into the 
early twentieth century, one gets the sense that both capital punishment and 
imprisonment were relatively cheap compared to their costs today, so that 
no one spent much time trying to figure out which was cheaper or arguing 
for or against the death penalty on such grounds.  Moreover, the strong 
ideological and religious commitments which motivated the use of the 
death penalty and imprisonment appear to have overwhelmed 
considerations of cost in the modern sense. 
By the mid-twentieth century, a consensus seemed to have emerged 
that long-term incarceration was in fact more expensive than capital 
punishment, despite any offset from prison labor.  Capital trials, especially 
in the South, involved minimal safeguards102 and often were completed, 
from jury selection to sentencing, in a matter of hours or (a few) days.  
Moreover, the interval between sentence and execution remained quite 
modest well into the twentieth century, as state and federal postconviction 
remedies remained relatively unintrusive.  That capital punishment 
produced economic advantages vis-à-vis long-term incarceration was “a 
very pervasive belief”103 in the second half of the twentieth century, so 
much so that the public continued to assume that capital punishment was 
the cheaper option even as the costs of administering the death penalty 
began to rise in the later decades of the twentieth century.104 
 
101 Vicars, supra note 75, at 142. 
102 See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
103 RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 187 (1991). 
104 See Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Lee Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A 
Close Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 116, 
142 tbl.6 (1983) (finding that 73.4% of respondents thought that the death penalty cost 
taxpayers less than life imprisonment). 
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The 1960s produced a sustained reexamination of capital punishment 
both in the public sphere and especially in the courts.  Capital sentences and 
executions declined substantially in the decades following World War II, 
and several states legislatively limited or abolished the death penalty in the 
early 1960s.  The Civil Rights movement and the Vietnam War generated 
considerable skepticism about the benign character of governmental power.  
A Gallup Poll in 1966 found for the first and only time that more 
Americans opposed capital punishment than supported it.105  Concerns 
about discrimination and abuse in the criminal justice system—particularly 
the perfunctory trials of the old South—prompted the Warren Court to 
extend many of the criminal procedure protections in the Bill of Rights 
against the states, including the exclusionary rule of the Fourth 
Amendment, the rights to counsel and jury trial in the Sixth Amendment, 
and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth 
Amendment.  When several members of the Court signaled in 1963 that the 
death penalty might be disproportionate when used to punish the crime of 
rape,106 the nation’s leading civil rights organization, the Legal Defense 
Fund of the NAACP (LDF), embarked on an ambitious “moratorium” 
strategy to bring executions in the country to a halt.107 
In defending death-sentenced inmates, LDF lawyers made use of the 
many newly recognized procedural protections available in state criminal 
proceedings.  They also developed a distinctive set of arguments focused on 
the failings of the American death penalty itself.  These core arguments 
emphasized the discriminatory and arbitrary administration of the death 
penalty, the lack of continuing public support for the punishment, the 
anachronistic character of “retributive” defenses of the death penalty, and 
the inability of the death penalty to serve any important social values 
(including deterrence), especially in light of its rare imposition. 
The LDF strategy succeeded in bringing executions to a halt, and the 
Supreme Court agreed to decide whether the American death penalty 
comported with “evolving standards of decency” under the Eighth 
Amendment.  The resulting decision in Furman v. Georgia108 invalidated 
 
105 Frank Newport, In U.S., Two-Thirds Continue to Support Death Penalty, GALLUP, 
Oct. 23, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/123638/In-U.S.-Two-Thirds-Continue-Support-
Death-Penalty.aspx. 
106 Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (lamenting the 
Court’s unwillingness to decide whether “the imposition of the death penalty by those States 
which retain it for rape violate[s] ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of 
[our]maturing society’ or ‘standards of decency more or less universally accepted’”). 
107 MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 107 (1973). 
108 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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prevailing capital statutes largely because of their failure to provide 
adequate guidance to sentencers in choosing between life and death.  The 
case generated the most sustained judicial consideration of the American 
death penalty in U.S. history, with almost 250 pages in the U.S. Reports 
offering arguments supporting and opposing its continued use.109  Notably 
absent from the extensive discussions is any sustained focus on the question 
of cost.  Indeed, the sole mention of cost was offered by Justice Marshall to 
rebut the claim that the death penalty is a cheaper alternative than 
imprisonment: “As for the argument that it is cheaper to execute a capital 
offender than to imprison him for life, even assuming that such an 
argument, if true, would support a capital sanction, it is simply 
incorrect.”110  The absence of the cost argument in the various opinions 
stems in part from the fact that the cost argument is not a constitutional 
argument against the death penalty (though it might be part of a 
constitutional defense of the punishment, in response to the claim that the 
death penalty serves no valid state goals).  But the absence of the cost 
argument is likely also attributable to the widespread belief (and perhaps 
reality) that the death penalty was comparatively cheaper than long-term 
imprisonment.  At the time of Furman and well into the 1980s, supporters 
of the death penalty were much more likely than opponents to list the cost 
of the death penalty as a reason supporting their position.111 
Furman itself, though, would radically reshape the economics of 
capital punishment.  By embarking on a course of constitutional regulation 
of the death penalty—the defining feature of the “modern era” of the 
American death penalty—the Court would significantly increase the costs 
of capital litigation.  Neither the increase in costs nor the shift in public 
opinion would occur overnight.  It would take more than a quarter century 
before the conventional wisdom regarding the comparatively higher cost of 
imprisonment would give way to a new, widespread belief that the death 
penalty is substantially more expensive than the alternative of 
imprisonment—even life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 
In the wake of Furman, numerous states sought to cure the 
constitutional defect of standardless discretion by redrafting their capital 
statutes.  Some states made the death penalty mandatory for certain 
offenses, while others sought to structure the death penalty decision through 
the use of aggravating and mitigating factors.  When the Supreme Court 
 
109 Id. at 239-470. 
110 Id. at 357 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
111 Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: Americans’ 
Views on the Death Penalty, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 
90, 98 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997). 
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revisited capital punishment in 1976, reviewing five of the new capital 
schemes, it upheld the guided discretion statutes and invalidated the 
mandatory ones.112  It rejected the mandatory statutes because of the 
“qualitative difference” between capital and non-capital punishment, 
inaugurating a new constitutional commitment to the death-is-different 
principle.113 
The defining feature of the guided discretion schemes was the 
establishment of a distinct punishment phase in capital proceedings during 
which the jury (or judge) would be focused solely on the question of 
punishment.  The guided discretion statutes no longer permitted the death 
penalty to be imposed for the crime of murder or rape without a separate 
finding of at least one “aggravating” factor.  Moreover, the bifurcated 
structure of capital proceedings suggested that defense attorneys should 
devote substantial energy and resources not only to the question of guilt or 
innocence, but also to developing and presenting “mitigating” evidence that 
might justify a sentence less than death. 
As a result of the recasting of state capital statutes, as well as the 
Court’s embrace of the “death-is-different” principle, the costs associated 
with capital trials would grow exponentially in the following decades.  The 
new model of bifurcated proceedings with a focused punishment phase 
would gradually become the national norm, and the Court’s emerging 
capital doctrines would substantially alter many state capital trial practices, 
including voir dire, the use of experts, the expectations of defense counsel, 
and, especially, the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence.  
In addition, post-trial litigation costs would become vastly greater in capital 
cases.  At the state level, most states gradually developed schemes requiring 
the appointment of counsel for death-sentenced inmates in state 
postconviction proceedings even though non-capital inmates had no such 
right to post-trial representation.  Congress likewise made provision for 
appointment of counsel in capital federal habeas proceedings (with non-
capital inmates enjoying no comparable entitlement).114 
The Supreme Court’s development of intricate doctrines governing 
capital proceedings greatly extended the average time between sentence and 
execution.  During the first two decades of constitutional regulation, capital 
sentences were subject to a remarkable reversal rate, with about 68% of 
 
112 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-208 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 
242, 259-260 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976). 
113 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). 
114 21 U.S.C § 848(q)(4)(B) (2006) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 231, 232 
(2006)). 
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capital verdicts invalidated on direct appeal or in postconviction.115  As a 
result, the number of inmates on death rows throughout the country 
increased dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s, reaching a modern era 
nationwide high of over 3,500 inmates by 2000—over five times the size of 
the national death row that accumulated during the five-year moratorium on 
executions preceding Furman.116 
The bulk of the new expenses in capital litigation are incurred at trial.  
But the cost of managing large death rows has also become quite 
substantial.  In California, for example, a recent report indicated that death-
row incarceration costs the state an additional $90,000 per inmate, per year 
(above the cost of non-capital incarceration), or $60 million a year 
overall.117  Moreover, in a number of states (including California), the 
prospects for converting death sentences into executions remain quite 
remote.  The multiple opportunities for review at different stages and in 
different courts allow for executions to be avoided almost altogether in 
jurisdictions where there is not a sustained political will for them to go 
forward.  Given the intricate doctrines surrounding the implementation of 
the death penalty, executions require a “perfect storm” of cooperation 
involving numerous actors, including local prosecutors and judges, state-
wide prosecutors and judges, state executive officials, and federal judges.  
As a result, only a handful of the thirty-five states that currently authorize 
the death penalty have carried out significant numbers of executions over 
the past thirty-five years (with only five carrying out more than fifty, and 
with three—Texas, Virginia, and Oklahoma—accounting for more than half 
(661) of the executions nationwide (1,261)).118 
The combination of increased trial costs, increased postconviction 
litigation costs, and increased incarceration costs in capital cases, together 
with the absence of significant numbers of executions in many states, has 
changed the way in which the “costs” of the death penalty are understood 
and discussed.  The relative cost of the death penalty is no longer captured 
by a simple comparison of the cost of a capital trial together with the cost of 
 
115 James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 
78 TEX L. REV. 1839, 1850 (2000). 
116 For the increase in death row inmates during the 1980s and 1990s, see Death Penalty 
Information Center, Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 to 2008 (2010), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-1977-2008.  For the number 
of people on death row at the time of Furman, see MELTSNER, supra note 107, at 292-93. 
117 CALIFORNIA COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 141  
(Gerald Uelmen ed., 2008), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/ 
CCFAJFinalReport.pdf.  
118 State by State Database, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state (last visited Aug. 18, 2010). 
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carrying out an execution, on the one hand, versus the cost of a non-capital 
trial and the cost of lengthy imprisonment, on the other.  Rather, the relative 
cost of administering the death penalty post-Furman now often requires a 
comparison of the cost of multiple capital trials and the cost of lengthy, 
often indefinite imprisonment on death row versus the cost of a single, non-
capital trial and the cost of lengthy (non-capital) imprisonment. 
Indeed, the modern era has inaugurated a new measure of the cost of 
the death penalty: the cost per execution in a particular state.  This 
accounting method divides the total expenditures on capital cases within a 
jurisdiction (trial costs, postconviction litigation costs, death-row 
incarceration costs) by the number of death sentences the jurisdiction 
actually consummates with an execution.  In jurisdictions with few 
executions, the figures are staggering.  Using this approach, a recent 
editorial in the New York Times suggested that California’s thirteen 
executions over the past thirty-five years cost about a quarter of a billion 
dollars each.119  In Maryland, which came close to abolishing the death 
penalty in its recent legislative session, a 2008 study indicated that the state 
spent at least an additional $37.2 million for each of the state’s five 
executions in the modern era.120 
Concerns about the cost of capital punishment were first voiced with 
some frequency beginning in the 1990s, as changes in capital practice and 
the growth of death rows began to transform the economics of capital 
punishment.  Such concerns undoubtedly have contributed to the 
extraordinary decline in capital sentencing over the past fifteen years.  In 
the mid-1990s, the yearly number of death sentences obtained nationwide 
averaged about 326.121  Since that time, capital sentences have declined 
over 60%, with annual death sentences over the past three years hovering 
around 112.122  This remarkable decline in death sentences is not 
attributable to the relatively modest decline in murders during this period 
(in fact, the murder rate has remained virtually constant from 2000-2007, at 
the same time that death sentences dropped about 50%).123  Although there 
 
119 Editorial, High Cost of Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2009, at A22. 
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is no comprehensive data definitively establishing the causes of the decline, 
the available evidence points to the decreased willingness of district 
attorneys to seek the death penalty, in large part because of cost concerns.  
Prosecutors declining to seek death have repeatedly defended their 
decisions on cost-cutting grounds,124 and numerous editorials and news 
reports have brought public attention and scrutiny to expensive cases in 
which prosecutors chose to seek death.125 
The most tangible evidence of the emergence of the cost argument has 
surfaced in contemporary legislative debates about whether to retain the 
death penalty.  The cost argument may well have been decisive in the 
legislative repeals of the death penalty in New Jersey (2007) and New 
Mexico (2009), as well as the decision not to reinstate the death penalty in 
New York after its statute was found defective in 2004.  In New Jersey, 
public opinion leaned toward retention at the time the legislature acted.126  
The state commission charged with studying capital punishment concluded 
that the death penalty was no longer consistent with evolving standards of 
decency.127  But, as newspaper coverage of the legislative decision reflects, 
“equally persuasive to lawmakers was not saving lives but saving 
money,”128 given the increased costs of death-row incarceration.  A policy 
report indicated that New Jersey had spent over a quarter of a billion dollars 
on the death penalty in the two or so decades prior to repeal (over and 
above what the state would have spent on life without the possibility of 
parole)129 even though the death-row population numbered only ten and no 
executions had been carried out by the time repeal was achieved.  In low 
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death-sentencing, low executing states like New Jersey, the cost of the 
death penalty is measured by the cost of maintaining a capital system and 
not simply the cost of particular cases.  Along these lines, New Hampshire 
is presently considering whether to repeal its capital statute, and one of the 
six questions to be addressed by a specially formed commission is whether 
“there is a significant difference in the cost of prosecution and incarceration 
between capital punishment and life without possibility of parole for the 
convicted capital murderer.”130  Like New Jersey, New Hampshire has a 
relatively dormant capital system, with only one inmate on death row and 
no executions since 1939; one of the immediate financial considerations, 
though, is whether to construct and staff a lethal injection death chamber, as 
a recent state department of corrections master plan indicated that such an 
effort would cost the state over $3 million.131  In New York, after the state’s 
capital statute (enacted in 1995) was invalidated by the state courts in 2004, 
the state assembly conducted extensive public hearings to inform its 
decision whether to fix the eminently correctable defect in the statute.  
Among the prominent considerations in its decision not to act was the high 
cost of administering a capital system.  The assembly’s report on the public 
hearings cited testimony from a district attorney that the state spent as much 
as $200 million on capital prosecutions in the decade or so that the statute 
had been in effect and that the reinstatement of the death penalty might cost 
the state an additional $500 million over twenty years, while likely yielding 
only two or three executions during that period.132 
In New Mexico, the only state to repeal its capital statute since the 
economic downturn of late 2008, the cost issue may have tipped the 
balance.  As one commentator observed: 
[T]he New Mexico abolition campaign made use of an argument never used in death 
penalty debate in the 1960s and 1970s but which probably helped turn the tide in 
2009—the cost of administering the death penalty, from trial to appeal to post 
conviction relief to federal habeas corpus to isolation of men on death row to costs of 
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execution was simply an expenditure of too much public money when the state was 
starving for dollars for good programs.133 
The cost argument has also been prominent in several other states in 
which repeal has been considered but not accomplished.  In Colorado, for 
example, the effort to repeal the death penalty was explicitly tied to freeing 
up funds to solve “cold cases.”134  Despite its small death row (three), 
Colorado apparently spends approximately four million dollars a year on 
capital costs.135  The proposed legislation mandated that the money saved 
by abolishing the death penalty would be dedicated to funding eight state 
investigators who would reopen more than 1,400 cold case homicides.136  
Although the measure was barely defeated, the striking aspect of the 
Colorado experience was the abolitionist strategy to drive home the 
opportunity costs of retention by highlighting in concrete terms the 
alternative goods that death penalty dollars could purchase. 
References to the issue of cost have exploded over the past two years 
in response to the global fiscal crisis.  Cash-strapped states face increasing 
pressure to moderate their use of the death penalty or abandon it altogether.  
Recent editorials in California, with titles such as “Save $1 Billion in Five 
Years—End the Death Penalty,”137 and “California Can’t Afford the Death 
Penalty,”138 capture the prevailing mood.  Similar editorials have appeared 
throughout the country lamenting the expense of capital punishment.  The 
National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty—the leading abolitionist 
organization in the country—now lists as its first (of ten) public policy 
arguments against the death penalty: “Executions are carried out at a 
staggering cost to taxpayers.”139  The Death Penalty Information Center, 
which both reports on, and editorializes about, the American death penalty, 
has stepped up its coverage of the financial implications of capital 
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punishment.  The heading of its recently released year-end summary 
declared: “Fewest Death Sentences Since Death Penalty Reinstated in 1976; 
As Costs Rose in a Time of Economic Crisis, Eleven States Considered 
Abolishing the Death Penalty.”140  This coverage followed the release of the 
Center’s earlier special report on the cost issue: “Smart on Crime: 
Reconsidering the Death Penalty in a Time of Economic Crisis.”141 
The newfound prominence of the cost argument is undoubtedly 
traceable to two important recent developments: the escalating costs of 
capital punishment in the modern era and the economic downturn over the 
past two years.  But the seemingly deep resonance of the cost argument in 
contemporary debate has other roots as well.  The cost argument effectively 
shifts the focus of anti-death penalty energy from individual rights and 
humanitarian-based arguments that never commanded wide or 
overwhelming public support in this country.  Whereas European 
opposition to the death penalty draws heavily from claims about human 
dignity and concerns about the potential abusive uses of state power (rooted 
in the memory of genocide, fascism, communism, and ethnic cleansing), 
there has never been widespread anxiety or ambivalence in this country 
about entrusting the state with the power to kill or subjecting individuals to 
this supreme sanction.  The states’ quick and decisive reaction to Furman—
thirty-five states quickly enacted new capital statutes in response to the 
Court’s decision—reflects to some degree the absence in this country of a 
politically significant coalition organized around deeply held, rights-based 
opposition to capital punishment. 
Thus, while the cost argument’s appearance may be the product of 
changed fiscal realities, it owes its special prominence and power to the 
way in which it focuses on uncontroversial, instrumental, collective goals 
rather than contentious claims about disputed individual “rights.”  The 
recent effort in Colorado to tie legislative repeal of the death penalty to 
increased funding for the investigation of unsolved murders is a clear 
example of the turn from focusing on the condemned to focusing on 
alternative collective goods.  In terms of practical politics, this change in 
focus toward instrumental argument has created a “bigger tent” for those 
concerned about capital punishment.  To accommodate this broader 
constituency (including politicians who have no interest in rejecting the 
death penalty as inhumane), advocates for withdrawal of the death penalty 
 
140 The Death Penalty in 2009: Year End Report, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER 
(2009), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2009YearEndReport.pdf. 
141 RICHARD C. DIETER, SMART ON CRIME: RECONSIDERING THE DEATH PENALTY IN A 
TIME OF ECONOMIC CRISIS (Death Penalty Information Center 2009), available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/CostsRptFinal.pdf. 
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have recast their efforts in terms of “repeal” rather than “abolition.”  The 
repeal movement—with its focus on pragmatic reassessment of the costs 
and benefits of the death penalty—has in many respects supplanted the 
narrower and less successful “abolition” movement, which, as the term 
connotes, has long been rooted in a moral imperative comparable to the 
effort to end slavery. 
The cost argument also provides a strong counter to the two most 
prominent “pro-death penalty” positions of the current era: retribution and 
deterrence.  The retributive argument, emphasizing that the death penalty 
provides the only appropriate moral response to the “worst” offenses and 
offenders, has become perhaps the most significant justification for the 
death penalty in recent years as part of the general revival of retributivism 
as the leading theory of punishment.  Like the anti-death penalty argument 
emphasizing human dignity, the pro-death penalty retributive argument 
ultimately relies on an abstract moral claim that is not susceptible to 
empirical argument or instrumental balancing.  Against this lofty moral 
claim, proponents of repeal can insist that we simply cannot afford to base 
our criminal justice policy on this contested moral claim; the large size of 
the overall cost differential between capital and non-capital sentencing 
means that we sacrifice too much in terms of other public goods by 
retaining the death penalty.  As a result, the rhetorical position of 
abolitionists and retentionists in previous debates gets flipped: abolitionists 
get to shed the unattractive cloak of soft sentimentality and don the mantle 
of fiscal responsibility, while retentionists now have to rebut charges that 
their attachment to the death penalty is a form of unworldly moralism. 
The claim of deterrence by death penalty supporters has long been 
contested.  In the era preceding Furman, the claim that deterrence of murder 
was a justification for retaining capital punishment was generally accepted 
to be unproven, perhaps even unprovable.142  More recently, many 
economists and statisticians have revisited the question whether the death 
penalty deters, with some studies purporting to find statistically significant 
deterrent effects.  Although these studies have been subject to withering 
criticism from detractors, opponents of the death penalty have found 
themselves increasingly on the defensive about the possible value of the 
death penalty as a deterrent.143  The cost argument provides a powerful 
 
142 See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 90, at 156-57 (describing the pre-Furman consensus 
on the deterrence question based on the work of Thorsten Sellin). 
143 For summaries of both the new generation of deterrence studies and the criticisms the 
studies have engendered, see John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of 
Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 804-820 (2005); 
Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law and Causal Reasoning on Capital 
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rejoinder to the deterrence argument, because the unstated premise of the 
deterrence claim is that the resources expended on the death penalty are 
roughly comparable to those incurred via other sanctions.  If capital 
punishment were no more expensive than life imprisonment, then it would 
seem natural to focus largely on their comparative efficacy as alternative 
punishment options.  But if abolishing capital punishment would result in 
cost savings above and beyond the costs of lifetime incarceration, the 
additional money saved could be used for other projects—whether law 
enforcement initiatives such as Colorado’s proposed “cold case” funding or 
social programs such as funding for early childhood education—that might 
offer better crime control than the foregone executions.  Thus, even 
granting the claim that the death penalty deters homicide better than life 
imprisonment, opponents can still argue that the cost savings produced by 
abolition would yield maximum benefits to public safety.  The cost 
argument thus allows abolitionists to put deterrence in its (subsidiary) place 
in the larger calculus of crime prevention and to differentiate being “smart 
on crime” from being “tough on crime.” 
The power of the cost argument stems not only from its ability to focus 
political actors and the general public on competing public goods.  The 
concern about costs also indirectly sheds light on numerous pathologies in 
prevailing capital practice, including the inability of states to satisfy 
minimum constitutional requirements in capital trials (reflected in high 
reversal rates), the absence of political will to carry out executions, the 
arbitrariness wrought by the few executions that in fact occur and the 
difficulties (both pragmatic and moral) stemming from prolonged death-
row incarceration.  Cost is not only a way of avoiding anti-death penalty 
arguments that have less traction (such as concerns about arbitrariness and 
human dignity); focusing on cost reminds the audience of these problems 
even as it concentrates attention on the bottom line.  Cost is thus a window 
into the current dysfunction of the American capital system, and it provides 
a non-ideological, non-controversial shorthand for expressing concern 
about a myriad of problems. 
B. THE DEATH ROW PHENOMENON: A DISTINCTIVE FEATURE OF 
MODERN CAPITAL PRACTICE 
The modern death penalty debate does not present a choice between 
lengthy imprisonment and execution.  Rather, the choice is between lengthy 
 
Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 269-89 (2006); Robert Weisberg, The Death 
Penalty Meets Social Science: Deterrence and Jury Behavior Under New Scrutiny, 1 ANN. 
REV. L. SOC. SCI. 151, 153-163 (2005). 
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imprisonment and lengthy imprisonment followed by execution.  Or, more 
accurately, the choice is between (1) lengthy imprisonment, and (2) lengthy 
imprisonment under extreme conditions (usually solitary confinement) 
followed by execution, or death in prison while still under a sentence of 
death.  The unprecedented length of the interval between sentence and 
execution, as well as the increasingly harsh conditions of death row, have 
generated a new and powerful concern about the American death penalty—
a concern that might well have significant constitutional ramifications. 
At the outset, it must be conceded that concerns about the interval 
between pronouncement of sentence and execution are not entirely “new.”  
Over a century ago, the Supreme Court invalidated the application of a 
Colorado law that had altered the post-sentence protocol for consummating 
death sentences with executions.144  The law became operative after the 
petitioner had committed his offense and been sentenced to death.  Among 
the changes in the protocol were substituting imprisonment in the county 
jail with solitary confinement in the state penitentiary and giving the 
warden discretion to set the date of execution whereas previously it had 
been fixed by the court.  The Supreme Court found that both of these 
changes violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution because they 
amounted to “greater punishment.”  The Court explained that solitary 
confinement had long been viewed as an additional punishment, citing an 
English statute passed under King George II that added solitary 
confinement to the punishment of death as a “further terror and peculiar 
mark of infamy” to deter “the horrid crime of murder [that had] of late been 
more frequently perpetrated.”145  The Court also cited the negative 
experiences associated with solitary confinement in this country, describing 
how, in prisons housing non-capital inmates, a 
considerable number of the prisoners [subjected to solitary confinement] fell, after 
even a short confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to 
impossible to arouse them, and others become violently insane . . . while those who 
stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover 
sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the community.146 
On the second issue, the Court insisted that affording the warden discretion 
to determine when the execution would be held (and to keep the date secret 
from the prisoner and the public) increased the petitioner’s punishment 
because “one of the most horrible feelings to which [the condemned] can be 
subjected during [the time confined in the penitentiary awaiting execution] 
 
144 In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890). 
145 Id. at 170. 
146 Id. at 168. 
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is the uncertainty during the whole of it . . . as to the precise time when his 
execution shall take place.”147 
What makes the Court’s ruling extraordinary in light of contemporary 
practice is not the suggestion that solitary confinement and uncertainty as to 
the date of execution constitute additional punishments.  It is the fact that 
the Colorado law set an outside limit of four weeks before the execution 
would be conducted and the warden’s discretion amounted only to deciding 
when, after at least two but not more than four weeks of confinement, the 
execution would be conducted. 
Today, of course, the interval between sentence and execution is often 
measured in decades rather than weeks (as in Colorado of the late 
nineteenth century) or months and years (as in the practice preceding 
Furman).  Moreover, the interval continues to increase; inmates executed in 
2007 had spent an average of 153 months on death row, compared to an 
average of about 140 months in 2000 and 95 months in 1990.148  In 
addition, the conditions of death row confinement have become appreciably 
worse over the past several decades.  Solitary confinement for as much as 
twenty-three hours a day has become the national norm, and most states 
prohibit death-sentenced inmates from group recreation or having any 
contact visits with family members or friends.  Until recently, Texas, which 
houses the third largest death row in the country, had permitted death-
sentenced inmates with good disciplinary records to participate in a work 
program (a garment factory) and group recreation.  But the state eliminated 
both programs in the wake of an escape incident from death row in 1998; as 
a result, death row was moved to a “super-max” facility in which death-
sentenced inmates are locked in their cells twenty-three hours a day and are 
permitted no physical contact with any other persons. 
As the American death penalty stabilized in the two decades following 
Furman—in the sense that questions about the constitutionality of the 
punishment itself receded from view—concerns about the cruelty and 
constitutionality of prolonged death row confinement began to be voiced.  
One catalyst for such reflections was the decision of the Privy Council in 
the early 1990s declaring that two Jamaican death sentences should be 
overturned based on the “inhuman” length of confinement awaiting 
execution (at the time of the decision, the appellants had spent about 
fourteen years in prison post-trial).149  American death-row prisoners had 
 
147 Id. at 172. 
148 Time on Death Row, Death Penalty Information Center, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/time-death-row#INTRODUCTION (last visited Aug. 18, 
2010). 
149 Pratt v. Att’y Gen. for Jamaica, [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) 4 (en banc). 
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challenged their length of confinement prior to the Privy Council 
decision,150 perhaps most famously in the efforts of Caryl Chessman to 
avoid execution in the early 1960s,151 but the issue had very little traction in 
the state or federal courts.  Most courts embraced the view expressed in 
Chessman’s case that “[i]t may show a basic weakness in our government 
system that a case like this takes so long, but I do not see how we can offer 
life (under a death sentence) as a prize for one who can stall the processes 
for a given number of years.”152 
The Privy Council decision was important not simply because it found 
the lengthy imprisonment intolerable, but because it identified the problem 
as a systemic one in the Jamaican system.  The Privy Council noted that 
numerous other prisoners had spent at least ten years awaiting execution 
and that such delays “had never happened in Jamaica before independence” 
or in the United Kingdom when it administered the death penalty.153  
Chessman’s lengthy death-row incarceration (twelve years) had been 
aberrational.  By the early 1990s, though, such incarceration in the U.S. 
while awaiting execution was increasingly becoming the norm. 
Soon after the Privy Council decision, Justice Stevens announced his 
interest in the constitutional question surrounding prolonged death-row 
incarceration in Lackey v. Texas,154 a case in which the Court denied 
certiorari.  He did not dissent from the Court’s refusal to hear the claim of 
the inmate (who had spent seventeen years on death row), recognizing that 
the “novel” issue should percolate in the state and lower federal courts.155  
He also identified some issues he thought relevant to the claim, such as the 
reasons for the delay in a particular inmate’s case (e.g., whether the inmate 
had submitted frivolous filings or whether the State’s negligent or 
deliberate actions had contributed to the delay).156  But his agnosticism 
about the claim was tempered by his suggestions of its merit, citing the 
rarity of delays at the time of the Founding, the suggestion in Medley that 
prolonged uncertainty about one’s fate generates “horrible feelings,” and 
 
150 See, e.g., Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting a 
constitutional claim based on length of death-row incarceration). 
151 Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1960). 
152 Id. at 607. 
153 Pratt, 2 A.C. at 17 (“The death penalty in the United Kingdom has always been 
carried out expeditiously after sentence, within a matter of weeks or in the event of an appeal 
even to the House of Lords within a matter of months.  Delays in terms of years are unheard 
of.”). 
154 514 U.S. 1045 (1995). 
155 Id. at 1047. 
156 Id. 
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the persuasive power of the Privy Council decision.157  Justice Breyer also 
indicated his agreement “that the issue is an important undecided one.”158 
Justice Stevens’s opinion respecting the denial of certiorari prompted 
inmates to raise “Lackey” claims with increasing frequency.  Together with 
the Privy Council decision, Stevens’s opinion also led to more extensive 
scholarly attention to both the psychological and legal aspects of the “death 
row phenomenon”—the physical and emotional consequences of prolonged 
incarceration under a sentence of death.  Over the past fifteen years, Justices 
Stevens and Breyer have repeatedly called for the Court to address the 
issue, with Justice Breyer characterizing the claim as “serious”159 and 
“particularly strong,”160 and Justice Stevens ultimately declaring that 
prolonged death row incarceration is “unacceptably cruel.”161 
What should we make of the repeated, unsuccessful efforts to bring the 
Lackey claim before the Court, with the most recent efforts162 occurring last 
year?  The claim clearly has enough staying power to command the 
sustained attention of members of the Court, and yet has not been embraced 
by any lower courts or been advanced as a major anti-death penalty 
argument in public discourse.  On the one hand, the problem is getting 
worse.  Whereas few inmates had been on death row as long as twenty 
years at the time Lackey was (not) decided, there are now considerable 
numbers of inmates who have been on death row at least two decades.  
Indeed, William Lee Thompson, the inmate whose Lackey claim was most 
recently before the Court in 2009, arrived on death row in 1976, about two 
years before Lackey; the additional fourteen year interval between the 
denial in Lackey’s case and the denial in his case meant that Thompson had 
spent over thirty-two years on death row (the Lackey claim itself has now 
been subject to prolonged limbo).  In addition, death-row confinement is 
much more severe than in the pre-Lackey era.  Justice Stevens made no 
mention of death-row conditions in his Lackey opinion, but his Thompson 
opinion describes the petitioner’s “23 hours per day in isolation in a 6- by 
9-foot cell.”163 
 
157 Id. at 1045-47. 
158 Id. at 1047. 
159 Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
160 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
161 Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1300 (2009) (Stevens, J., opinion respecting 
denial of certiorari). 
162 Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541 (2009) (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J., 
statement respecting the denial of certiorari); Thompson, 129 S. Ct. at 1300. 
163 129 S. Ct. at 1299. 
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On the other hand, the repeated unwillingness of other members of the 
Court to hear the Lackey claim reflects some obvious difficulties underlying 
the claim.  There is the Chessman problem, the reluctance to reward 
inmates who manage to keep their appeals (and themselves) alive long 
enough to challenge prolonged incarceration.  Justice Thomas, who has 
repeatedly criticized the Stevens-Breyer effort to bring the claim before the 
Court, has been particularly vehement in highlighting this concern, insisting 
that he is “unaware of any support in the American constitutional tradition 
or in this Court’s precedent for the proposition that a defendant can avail 
himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral procedures and then 
complain when his execution is delayed.”164  But even if that problem could 
be solved (by focusing on delays wholly or mostly attributable to the state, 
or by rejecting the notion that seeking enforcement of constitutional 
guarantees forfeits the right against excessively prolonged death-row 
incarceration), there remains the line-drawing problem.  Does the 
Constitution set an outside limit on death-row incarceration (five years? 
twenty years?)?  If a “rule” could be devised, how would the rule affect the 
behavior of lawyers and courts?  Would the recognition of a Lackey right to 
be free of excessive death-row incarceration lead to summary consideration 
of constitutional claims?  One of the likely reasons why the “prolonged 
incarceration” claim has not been vigorously embraced by abolitionists (the 
National Coalition Against the Death Penalty omits this argument in its list 
of ten reasons to oppose the death penalty165) is that one obvious response 
to the claim is to truncate protections in capital cases.  Moreover, specific 
concerns about the deprivations of death row (particularly solitary 
confinement) are also unlikely to find much resonance in either legal or 
popular opinion, given the extent to which concerns about prison conditions 
generally fall on deaf ears in both arenas.  Although states do not make 
solitary confinement a prescribed punishment for given offenses, solitary 
confinement has become increasingly common as an instrument of control 
in prisons.  The general deference afforded to prisons in maintaining order 
and discipline (both as a matter of law and public opinion) undermines any 
challenge to the conditions of confinement on death row. 
The real power of the Lackey claim is not in its potential to yield fruit 
as a cognizable claim of individual deprivation.  Rather, the issue sheds 
light on the dysfunctional character of our capital system.  In Lackey itself, 
 
164 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of 
certiorari). 
165 Death Penalty Overview: Ten Reasons Why Capital Punishment is Flawed Public 
Policy, NATIONAL COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY 2010), 
http://www.ncadp.org/index.cfm?content=5. 
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Justice Stevens, echoing Justice White’s opinion in Furman, intimated that 
the death penalty might become an unconstitutionally cruel punishment if it 
“ceases realistically to further” the purposes of retribution or deterrence.166  
Justice White had made this argument in light of the rarity of death 
sentences and executions in the era preceding Furman.  The increased 
death-sentencing in the wake of Furman likely persuaded Justice White that 
retention would not, as in the pre-Furman era, lead to “the pointless and 
needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any 
discernible social or public purposes.”167  But if executions are endlessly 
delayed, and carried out only after inmates have already suffered extensive, 
long-term deprivation, it is hard to see what additional retributive or 
deterrent value is secured by consummating the delayed executions.  In this 
respect, the argument about prolonged death row incarceration draws 
attention to the inability of states to carry out executions in a sufficiently 
timely fashion to claim any public benefit.  Concerns about the “death row 
phenomenon”—the cruelty visited upon particular inmates—is a window 
into the failure of the American death penalty to satisfy the minimal 
conditions for its continued use. 
It is thus not surprising that Justice Stevens, who had voted to uphold 
the death penalty in 1976,168 and who later declared that the American death 
penalty was no longer constitutionally sustainable in 2008,169 wove his 
argument about prolonged incarceration into his broader critique of the 
American system of capital punishment.  In Baze, Justice Stevens argued 
that the retention of the death penalty in the United States was “the product 
of habit and inattention rather than an acceptable deliberative process”170 
because the penalty no longer served the purposes of incapacitation, 
deterrence, or retribution.  It failed along these lines, in Justice Stevens’s 
view, because the widespread embrace of life-without-possibility-of-parole 
sentences had rendered the incapacitation goal unnecessary, the claim of 
deterrence had not been established, and the retributive value of the death 
penalty was undercut by its sanitized administration in the modern era.171  
In Thompson, Justice Stevens’s second-to-last word on Lackey,172 he 
 
166 Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1046 (1995) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring)). 
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invoked his dissent in Baze, arguing that “the diminished justification for 
carrying out an execution after the lapse of so much time”173 reinforced his 
view that the death penalty cannot withstand review via “an acceptable 
deliberative process.”174 
Interestingly, Justice Stevens’s position finds some support from an 
otherwise unlikely ally.  In the first few years following the reinstatement of 
the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia175 and its companion cases,176 Justice 
Rehnquist expressed concern about what he then regarded as inordinate 
delays in capital litigation.  Writing in 1981—fewer than five years post-
Gregg and at a time in which no inmate had spent as much as a decade on 
death row—Justice Rehnquist lamented that “hundreds of prisoners 
condemned to die [] languish on the various ‘death rows,’ [and] few of 
them appear to face any imminent prospect of their sentence being 
executed.”177  Presaging Justice Stevens’s later critique, Justice Rehnquist 
went on to say that delays between sentence and execution undermine the 
deterrent and retributive value of the death penalty.178  Justice Rehnquist 
made these observations not to lay the building blocks of a constitutional 
assault on the death penalty, but to encourage the Court to use its 
discretionary jurisdiction to accelerate executions.  His opinion—like many 
of those lamenting the failure of the Court to review Lackey claims—was 
framed as a dissent from the Court’s denial of certiorari in a capital case.  
The case, Coleman v. Balkcom,179 has largely been lost to history, even 
though it contains one of the more striking suggestions in capital litigation.  
Although Justice Rehnquist was unpersuaded that the Georgia courts had 
committed federal constitutional error in the petitioner’s case, he argued 
that the Court should grant certiorari in the case to expedite consideration of 
 
refusal of the lower federal court to review petitioner’s Lackey claim under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. 
173 Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1300 (2009). 
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175 428 U.S. 153, 206-08 (1976). 
176 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259-60 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 
(1976). 
177 Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 958 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari). 
178 Id. at 959 (“When society promises to punish by death certain criminal conduct, and 
then the courts fail to do so, the courts not only lessen the deterrent effect of the threat of 
capital punishment, they undermine the integrity of the entire criminal justice system.”); id. 
at 960 (“There can be little doubt that delay in the enforcement of capital punishment 
frustrates the purpose of retribution.”). 
179 451 U.S. 949 (1981). 
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his claims and to speed his execution.180  According to Justice Stevens, who 
agreed with the Court’s denial of certiorari, Justice Rehnquist was 
advancing the proposition “that we should promptly grant certiorari and 
decide the merits of every capital case coming from the state courts in order 
to expedite the administration of the death penalty.”181  Justice Stevens 
rejected this call, observing that “the Court wisely declines to select this 
group of [capital] cases in which to experiment with accelerated 
procedures.”182  Interestingly, Coleman is the first case in which Justice 
Stevens confronted the nascent Lackey problem, and he seemed to 
acquiesce in the “inevitab[ility] that there must be a significant period of 
incarceration on death row during the interval between sentencing and 
execution.”183 
Justice Rehnquist’s attempt to accelerate federal review of state death 
sentences was on its own terms designed to give states the freedom to reap 
the benefits of capital punishment.  But lurking in the opinion is 
undoubtedly also the concern that continued extensive delays in the 
administration of the death penalty might call into question the 
desirability—and perhaps constitutionality—of the death penalty itself.  
Justice Rehnquist’s lament that the Court’s constitutional regulation of the 
death penalty had “made it virtually impossible for States to enforce with 
reasonable promptness their constitutionally valid capital punishment 
statutes”184 seems almost quaint given how early his concerns were voiced 
in the modern experiment with federal constitutional regulation.  And it 
certainly is ironic that Justice Stevens, who rejected the call for accelerated 
procedures and accepted as inevitable some significant pre-execution 
incarceration, would insist almost thirty years later that such prolonged 
incarceration, together with other dysfunctional features of states’ death 
penalty practice, had rendered the American system of capital punishment 
unconstitutional. 
Ultimately, then, the significance of the “death row phenomenon” 
argument is the way in which it highlights the “American capital 
punishment phenomenon”—the prevailing fragility of the death penalty in 
this country given the ongoing, pronounced inability of states to 
 
180 Id. at 963 (“If capital punishment is indeed constitutional when imposed for the taking 
of the life of another human being, we cannot responsibly discharge our duty by pristinely 
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the litigation.”). 
181 Id. at 949 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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consummate death sentences with executions.  Even high executing states 
such as Texas and Florida have inmates who have been on death row since 
the late 1970s (as reflected by the fact that Lackey himself was a Texas 
inmate and another Lackey dissent-from-denial, in Knight v. Florida,185 
came to the Court from the Florida Supreme Court).  The problem is 
particularly pronounced in states such as California and Pennsylvania, 
where death-sentencing is high and executions are low or non-existent.  
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit Capital Punishment Handbook has a separate 
section called “Tenure on Death Row,”186 replete with citations to relevant 
cases and articles. 
Neither his comments in Baze nor his statement in Thompson were 
joined by any other members of the Court, but Justice Stevens’s attack on 
the administration of the death penalty (rather than the death penalty itself) 
resonates with recent Court opinions expressing concern about the 
American death penalty.  Over the past ten years, the Court has imposed 
strict proportionality limits on the death penalty, eliminating its availability 
for juveniles,187 persons with mental retardation,188 and for non-homicidal 
offenses against persons, such as the rape of a child.189  Dissenting justices 
have also expressed concerns about the lack of safeguards against the 
execution of the innocent,190 the potential disconnect between capital 
sentences and community values,191 and continuing arbitrariness in the 
distribution of death sentences and executions.192  It seems likely that any 
future effort to radically limit or constitutionally abolish the death penalty 
will be rooted not in a judicial declaration that the death penalty itself is 
inhumane or violative of human dignity, but in an opinion similar to the 
ones authored by Justice Stevens cataloguing the failure of the American 
death penalty to secure the goals the death penalty is said to advance, or to 
do so in an acceptable way.  Thus, the lingering claim of unacceptably cruel 
prolonged death row incarceration remains a potent reminder of the unmet 
promises of the American death penalty, and it could ultimately provide a 
wedge for reconsideration of the death penalty’s ultimate constitutionality. 
 
185 528 U.S. 990 (1999). 
186 Office of the Circuit Executive, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Ninth 
Circuit Capital Punishment Handbook, at Section 1.9 (Tenure on Death Row), available at 
http://207.41.19.15/web/sdocuments.nsf/3779242195bb2339882568480080d277/ 
24338af313e4f4f588256849006a4914?OpenDocument. 
187 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
188 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
189 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008). 
190 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 207 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
191 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 618 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). 
192 Id. at 617. 
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Outside of the courts, concerns about prolonged death-row 
incarceration have contributed to a powerful new policy argument against 
the death penalty: the claim that the death penalty disserves the families and 
loved ones of murder victims.  For many years, the claim that the death 
penalty should be retained to ease the pain of the victim’s family went 
largely unchallenged and unanswered.  Over the past two decades, though, 
coinciding with the dramatic expansion of the length of death-row 
incarceration, many opponents of the death penalty have highlighted the 
pain and frustration for victims’ families caused by extensive post-trial 
delays.  A recent editorial opposing capital punishment by a former district 
attorney in Oregon captures this new form of argument (as well as the cost 
argument): “Let me say that my compunctions primarily are not on moral or 
ethical grounds involving putting a convicted murderer to death, but on the 
way it is used (or not used) in this state, and the enormous expense in 
dollars and emotional capital for the families of homicide victims.”193  In a 
recent California case, the father of the murder victim agreed with the 
district attorney’s decision to accept a non-death plea in the multiple victim 
case because of the likely length of appeals.194  The father stated that 
“[w]hile our unequivocal first choice is the death penalty, we acknowledge 
that in California that penalty has become an empty promise,” and the 
district attorney indicated that her decision to accept the plea was motivated 
in part to spare the victims’ families the years of “suffering” that post-trial 
review would entail.  In New Jersey, Kathleen Garcia, a member of the 
state’s Death Penalty Study Commission who had lost a family member to 
murder, based her support of repeal on the harm to victims’ families caused 
by delays in the capital system.  In an editorial directed to the 
reconsideration of the death penalty in New Hampshire, Garcia wrote:  
Make no mistake—I am a conservative, a victims’ advocate and a death penalty 
supporter.  But my real life experience has taught me that as long as the death penalty 
is on the books in any form, it will continue to harm survivors.  For that reason alone, 
it must be ended.195 
 
193 Dan Glode, Editorial, Death Penalty Conflicts, NEWPORT NEWS TIMES, June 25, 2010, 
http://www.newportnewstimes.com/v2_news_articles.php?heading=0&story_id= 
23050&page=72. 
194 Teri Figueroa & Mark Walker, State’s Death Penalty Lacks Urgency: Chances of 
Dying from Old Age, Sickness or Suicide Are Greater than Lethal Injection, NORTH COUNTY 
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2010, http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/sdcounty/article_f54f505a-2993- 
5c54-a248-ca751d3091ed.html. 
195 Kathleen M. Garcia, Editorial, Death Penalty Hurts—Not Helps—Families of Murder 
Victims, NASHUA TELEGRAPH, Mar. 28, 2010, http://www.nashuatelegraph.com/ 
opinion/perspectives/687551-263/death-penalty-hurts--not-helps-.html. 
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Thus, the argument about the excessive cruelty to prisoners caused by 
delays in the system has lent significant support to the claim that our 
present system is excessively cruel to the families and loved ones of 
victims.  The irony, of course, is that the prisoners’ suffering is insufficient 
to console the survivors’ unmet expectation of, and hope for, executions, 
but the suffering on both sides leads to the same place—great reservations 
about the sustainability of the death penalty. 
Contemporary death penalty discourse thus increasingly avoids 
conflict over the abstract rightness or wrongness of punishing crime with 
death.  The debate over capital punishment has become a debate about the 
American system of capital punishment (with its costs and delays), and this 
turn has provided momentum to the repeal/abolition side.  The future 
stability of the death penalty depends either on a real shift on the ground in 
the economics and efficiency of the death penalty or on the ability of 
supporters to refocus the American death penalty debate on abstract 
retributive arguments, with their longstanding popular appeal in American 
culture, emphasizing that some crimes can be appropriately met only with 
death. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We have paid scant attention to the continuity across generations in 
arguments about the morality and wisdom of capital punishment.  As any 
high school debater could attest, there is a set of relatively stable arguments 
that appear and reappear with regularity in different times and places.  
However, the foregoing discussion puts to rest the much stronger notion 
that death penalty debates are entirely static.  Rather, it is clear that there are 
discontinuities across eras—discontinuities so dramatic that participants 
from an earlier era could not have anticipated, and those from a later era 
might not even remember, some of the central claims and arguments made 
at a different time.  So, as we have reflected on the nature of capital 
punishment on the one-hundredth anniversary of this important journal, we 
have highlighted ways in which the discontinuity in arguments surrounding 
the death penalty has revealed significant discontinuities in the broader 
legal and political culture.  In our examination of the changing debates, we 
have illuminated the different fundamental values that were thought to be 
implicated by the abolition or retention of the death penalty at different 
times.  In addition, we have uncovered the ways in which debates about the 
death penalty are not hermetically sealed from other controversial issues of 
the day, such as the pressing problem of lynchings in the early twentieth 
century, and the deep financial crisis in the early twenty-first century.  The 
metamorphosis of the values and issues involved, and the terms in which 
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they are addressed, shows that there is surprising elasticity in what is 
encompassed and at stake in death penalty debates over time. 
Moreover, discontinuities in discourse can be understood only in the 
full context of how the death penalty was actually administered in the 
different eras.  The debates reveal enormous changes in the practice of the 
death penalty on the ground, including the types of offenses thought to be 
death-worthy, the kinds of victims and perpetrators involved, the 
procedures for adjudicating guilt and sentence, the modes of execution, and 
the nature of death row confinement and prisons more broadly—in short, 
the entire criminal justice apparatus surrounding the death penalty.  The 
debates about the death penalty in different eras thus shed light not only on 
the values and issues that are thought to be implicated by the practice of 
capital punishment in the abstract, but also on the particularities of the 
practice of capital punishment at a given time.  In other words, changes in 
discourse reveal not only what capital punishment meant or symbolized but 
also what capital punishment was or is. 
When we look back one hundred years to Ed Johnson’s rudimentary 
trial and extrajudicial execution in the face of the Supreme Court’s effort to 
exercise jurisdiction over his case, we cannot help being struck by the 
foreignness of Ed Johnson’s world.  It is easier, however, to forget the 
strangeness of the discourse of the past, in part because words fade more 
quickly than deeds.  By being attentive to the actual debates of the past, we 
can recapture the particularity of the everyday world in which the death 
penalty operated, and engage what the abolition or retention of the death 
penalty meant at different historical moments.  Such reflection also allows 
us to see how the language and arguments of present death penalty 
discourse reveal important aspects of our own world.  The foreignness of 
the past in both practice and discourse helps reveal the contingency of the 
present and suggests new possibilities for the future. 
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